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Abstract: 
Building upon results of prior focus group research, the present study employs online 
surveys about possible future developments of the vulnerability of families with children in 
Europe. In addition, respondents assessed the relevance of societal factors influencing future 
family well-being and the effectiveness of ten selected policy measures in preventing the 
intergenerational transfer of vulnerability. One survey was directed at scientists and 
practitioners who are family experts (N=175). Another survey aimed at exploring the 
thoughts of parents themselves (N=1,343). Results show that experts are rather pessimistic 
and even expect vulnerability to increase in the future. In their opinion, the most relevant 
forces driving future vulnerability seem to be economic development—manifesting itself in 
unemployment and earnings inequality—and family policy. As for policy measures, 
childcare availability, early childhood education, assistance for children with special needs 
and raising awareness of employers for work–family reconciliation were ranked highly for 
mitigating the reproduction of vulnerability. While parents largely share the opinions of 
experts with regard to forces relevant for future family well-being, they evaluate some of the 
policy measures differently: the main disparities concern the assessment of support for stay-
at-home mothers and the weight given to education for children after school and during 
holidays. 
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Executive Summary 
What will the future bring for families in Europe? Work Package 10 of the 
FamiliesAndSocieties project is dedicated to various foresight activities aiming to outline 
different scenarios for the future of families. Within the work package, several studies were 
designed to explore future challenges for social policy. Online surveys presented in this report 
draw on insights from the preceding focus group research. Like the focus group research, they 
focus on vulnerability of families with children: factors influencing the future shares of 
vulnerable families and their well-being as well as policy measures inhibiting the 
intergenerational transfer of vulnerability within families. An expert survey directed at 
scientists and practitioners and a family survey among parents were conducted separately to 
compare opinions of different relevant groups on these issues. 
 
The expert survey sought to gather information regarding expected changes in vulnerability of 
families with children as well as in its underlying determinants (drivers). Therefore, the 
questionnaire addressed the likely development of fifteen drivers representing five major 
forces and their assumed effects on the shares of vulnerable families in a selected European 
country in 2050, distinguishing between three different dimensions of vulnerability: economic 
vulnerability (referring to financial aspects and poverty risks), psychological vulnerability 
(summarising feelings of stress, anxiety or depression) and social vulnerability (comprising 
stigmatisation, discrimination and a lack of social support). In addition, experts were 
requested to rate the relevance of ten policy components for stopping the reproduction of 
vulnerability within families. Data collection lasted for three months—from early December 
2015 to early March 2016. In total, 203 assessments of future vulnerability developments 
from 175 submitted questionnaires were used for the analyses. Answers referred to 29 
different European countries. The family survey also included questions on the relative 
importance of the identified five major forces driving future well-being of families and ten 
policy measures hindering the reproduction of vulnerability. Data collection took place 
between late March and early June 2016. Responding parents (N=1,343) live in 22 different 
European countries. Most of them, however, are from one of the following three countries: 
Germany, Portugal and Spain. 
 
More than two-thirds of the experts predicted that economic vulnerability will increase during 
the next years (until 2020) and about one-half of them stated that the share of families 
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affected by economic vulnerability will further increase in the period from 2020 to 2050. 
Even more pessimistic were predictions regarding psychological vulnerability. Eight out of 
ten experts thought that the share of families whose members suffer from psychological 
vulnerability will increase in the next five years. Three-quarters of respondents expect the 
extent of psychological vulnerability to grow after 2020. Regarding social vulnerability, 
results are similar to those for economic and psychological vulnerability but slightly more 
optimistic. 
 
Experts also indicated the (relative) importance of five different societal forces for the changes 
in vulnerability to be expected: (a) economic development, (b) changes in gender roles, 
(c) general cultural changes, (d) the development of employment factors related to the 
reconciliation of family and work and (e) changes in family policy. In general, each of the 
five forces was attributed some relevance for the future vulnerability of families with 
children. Some of these forces, however, were perceived to be more relevant than others. 
Experts assessed economic development to be most relevant for all three dimensions of 
vulnerability. Changes in family policy were also expected to be relevant for economic, 
psychological and social vulnerability. While the development of work–family reconciliation 
scored high with regard to psychological and social vulnerability, changes in gender roles 
seem to be perceived of relevance primarily for psychological vulnerability. Parents 
responding to the family questionnaire thought that changes in family policies and in the 
reconciliation of family life and professional work will be most important for future well-
being of families. However, they also placed high value on the future economic development. 
 
Findings gained from assessments of fifteen drivers—three indicators for each force—largely 
correspond to the results using the general evaluations of forces. Experts usually emphasised 
the effects of drivers referring to economic development (e.g. unemployment), family policy 
(e.g. public childcare) and—sometimes—reconciliation issues (e.g. job demands). For 
instance, experts estimated that a rise in earning inequality and a decrease in public financial 
transfers to families would contribute to an increase in future economic, social and 
psychological vulnerability. The consequences of changes in gender roles and other cultural 
aspects for the vulnerability of families with children were not considered to be as important 
unless psychological vulnerability was addressed. In this regard, the findings show that 
experts expected an increase in female labour force participation and a weakening of personal 
relationships to increase future psychological vulnerability. 
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Finally, experts assessed the relevance of policies in preventing vulnerability from being 
passed on from parents to their children. Drawing upon the results of focus group research, 
ten policy measures were selected and, in general, all ten measures were expected to be 
important by responding experts. Four of them, however, got very high ratings: (1) providing 
flexible, affordable childcare options for preschool children, (2) organising assistance for 
children with special needs, (3) making employers aware that it makes sense to care for the 
work–life balance of their employees and (4) providing education for all children already at 
an early age. For each of these four measures, more than half the experts thought it to be 
“indispensable” or at least “very important” to stop the reproduction of vulnerability while no 
more than five per cent perceived it to be “irrelevant” or “counter-productive”. 
 
In line with experts, parents rated “making employers aware that it makes sense to care for the 
work–life balance of their employees” highest, putting “assistance for children with special 
needs” in third place. Participants of the family survey, however, did not agree with experts 
on each and every policy measure. The effectiveness of support for stay-at-home mothers was 
given a completely different weight: while experts ranked it (on average) in last place, parents 
(on average) thought it to be the second most important policy component. Another disparity 
concerns education: although parents stated that education at an early age and education after 
school and in holidays are important, they were ranked lowest among the ten policy measures. 
 
The report ends with suggestions to observe and monitor vulnerability and—by that—
improve policies. Parents responding to the family questionnaire are obviously convinced that 
policies can make their lives easier and family experts view them as an important instrument 
to reduce vulnerability as well. Nevertheless, they expect the vulnerability of families with 
children to increase during the forthcoming decades. An operative monitoring using synthetic 
indices measuring the economic, psychological and social dimension of vulnerability could 
inform future policy. Furthermore, it is argued that a mainstreaming approach seems to be 
most promising because family vulnerability permeates numerous policy areas (labour market 
policies, family policies, educational policies etc.). Finally, raising the awareness for 
vulnerable families, vulnerable children and the problem of vulnerability transfers across 
generations is needed not only with respect to employers but to society at large. This could be 
an appropriate field to cooperate with NGOs. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the Europe 2020 target on poverty and social exclusion states that at least 20 million 
less should be at risk of poverty and social exclusion, the absolute number of EU citizens 
living in vulnerable circumstances has increased by approximately 5 million since 2008. 
Advances in the reduction of vulnerability remain small (cf. Eurofound, 2015). Especially the 
high rates of child poverty are a persistent challenge for European social politics. Against this 
background, the current report focuses on vulnerability of families with children and 
concentrates on the future of these families. What major factors will drive the future 
vulnerability of families with children? Will there be differences between different regions of 
Europe? These and other questions are addressed by means of an online questionnaire that 
collected 176 opinions and views from experts all over Europe. This working paper is 
primarily documenting the outcomes of this expert questionnaire study and discusses its 
findings within the context of a broader framework of research—including an online 
questionnaire collecting the opinions of more than 1,300 parents on the same issues. 
 
The intergenerational transmission of vulnerability is a problem closely related to the future of 
vulnerability in Europe, another huge challenge for European societies and the second major 
topic of the present report. As growing up poor deteriorates later-life chances (for a review 
see Jenkins & Siedler, 2007), vulnerability often reproduces vulnerability. Thus, the present 
paper also asks which policy measures could inhibit (or at least mitigate) the reproduction of 
vulnerability within families in the future. Do experts stress the importance of well-known 
family policies (financial transfers, childcare, parental leave) or do they prefer other policy 
areas? Can education really offer long-term solutions? In our questionnaire, experts expressed 
their opinion by rating the relevance of ten selected policy measures compromising different 
types of policies to support families and/or children. 
 
The same topics were also covered in an additional online questionnaire directed at parents 
who are confronted with the challenges of family life on a daily basis. This allows a 
comparison of parents’ opinions with experts’ opinions on two critical policy issues: main 
drivers of (future) family well-being and measures to fight the reproduction of vulnerability. 
Especially, the parents’ opinion on the second topic is crucial as any implemented policy 
measure will affect their family life. 
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The present paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the background and the aims of 
the questionnaire studies and informs about their position within the foresight approach of 
Work Package 10 of the FamiliesAndSocieties project. Section 3 outlines past trends with 
regard to the major topics of this report—the share of vulnerable families with children and 
the reproduction of vulnerability. Section 4 discusses methodological issues and 
organisational aspects regarding both online surveys. Section 5 presents the results of the 
expert survey. In Section 6, conducted analyses of the family survey are described. All 
findings are finally discussed in Section 7 in which the report concludes with possible 
implications for future policies. 
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2. Thematic background and foci of questionnaires 
2.1. Development of research topics 
The online surveys with experts and parents constitute the final segments of a bigger research 
scheme including several consecutive and closely related research activities (see Di Giulio et 
al., 2013). Their thematic foci were thus defined by previous findings. Figure 1 summarises 
the whole research process and demonstrates the connections between the different steps 
taken. 
 
Qualitative foresight research in the FamiliesAndSocieties project started with the “Futures 
task force workshop” in Tallinn, Estonia in January 2014 (see Philipov et al., 2014). In this 
workshop, 25 stakeholders and 12 project participants from different European institutions 
discussed four topics: gender relationships, childcare arrangements, economic (in)security and 
intergenerational linkages in the family. It turned out that a few central themes permeated all 
the discussions. Among them was the topic of vulnerable families.1 In addition, participants 
paid a lot of attention to children and their well-being. Together, these findings point to the 
ongoing reproduction of vulnerability within families, raising the question of how to break 
this cycle of reproduction (cf. Philipov et al., 2014). In the end, these topics delimited the core 
area of interest for the next step in qualitative research on the future of families in Europe: 
focus group discussions with family experts. 
 
Five focus group discussions with policymakers and civil society actors engaged in family-
related issues were conducted in Vienna, Madrid, Stockholm, Brussels, and Warsaw between 
November 2014 and January 2015 (see Mynarska et al., 2015). The participating 37 experts 
discussed the following three questions: (1) Which types of families with children might be 
particularly vulnerable and why? (2) In what ways might different future developments affect 
these families? (3) What policy measures would be crucial to prevent the reproduction of 
vulnerability within families in the future? 
 
Results of focus groups included three basic components. First, experts identified family types 
with high risks of vulnerability (especially single-parent families). During the discussion of 
                                                 
1 It has to be noted that the term “families in situations in which they are vulnerable” would be more adequate as 
there are no “vulnerable families” per se. Vulnerability is often a temporary phenomenon. 
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vulnerable family types, they mentioned different aspects and dimensions of vulnerability 
(financial, emotional etc.). Second, participants expressed their opinions on several future 
developments and identified major forces that may shape the future of European families and 
their well-being (e.g. economic development, cultural change). Finally, a wide array of policy 
components that could help to mitigate consequences of vulnerability for children and—in 
their opinion—prevent the reproduction of vulnerability within families were discussed 
(cf. Mynarska et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 1: Steps of the qualitative foresight research approach 
 
 
 
These results set the scope for the surveys that are the subject matter of the present report. The 
expert survey included definitions of dimensions of vulnerability that directly rely on results 
of the focus group research. Drawing upon the outcomes of the conducted focus group 
discussions, its main part asked about estimates of the development of five major forces and 
their effects on the shares of vulnerable families in 2050. Finally, the relevance of selected 
policy components to stop the reproduction of vulnerability within families—again based on 
suggestions by focus group discussants—was expressed by way of rating scales. 
 
The family survey was directed towards parents to examine the needs of families and learn 
more about the significance of specific worries regarding the future of their children. In order 
to be informed about these topics, a much broader range of questions than in the expert 
Future task workshop (2014)
Four topics: economic (in)security, gender relations, 
childcare arrangements, intergenerational linkages
Main results: relevance of vulnerability and children’s needs/well-being
   
Focus group discussions (2014/15) 
Focus: future of vulnerable families with children
Main results: different dimensions of vulnerability, main drivers affecting the future of these 
families,  policies hindering the reproduction of vulnerability
Expert questionnaire (2015/16)
(1) asking about the impact of drivers 
on vulnerability dimensions
(2) quantifying qualitative results of 
the focus group discussions
Family questionnaire (2016)
What do families think?
(1) relevance of drivers
(2) effectiveness of policies
1.
2.
3. comparing results
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questionnaire had to be asked. Nevertheless, the family questionnaire also contained items 
covering the relevance of the five major forces for future well-being of families as well as the 
importance of policy measures designed to hinder the reproduction of vulnerability. These 
questions were not exactly the same but very similar to those included in the expert 
questionnaire.2 Asking for opinions of experts and parents separately should allow comparing 
their opinions on these issues. 
 
2.2. Concepts and dimensions of “vulnerability” 
Vulnerability can be broadly described as “the capacity to be wounded” (Patterson, 2013, 
p. 1). In the literature, many dimensions of vulnerability are discussed (cf. Radcliff et al., 
2012; Roelen et al., 2012). There are families with children who are at risk of poverty, and 
families who experience a lack of social support in daily life. Some families suffer from 
problems related to stress or from health problems. In other families the children experience a 
negative relationship with their parents (e.g. because of a lacking sense of security, conflicts 
between the parents or domestic violence). 
 
For focus group research on vulnerable families, we defined vulnerability as a complex 
phenomenon comprising (a) financial problems, (b) social exclusion,3 (c) a lack of social 
support from personal networks, (d) stigmatisation, (e) difficulties arising from poor physical 
or mental health, and (f) being a victim of crime (esp. family violence). Though vulnerable 
families are often confronted with many challenges at the same time—for example, families 
lacking financial resources often perceive strong emotional and social pressures, too (Holand, 
Lujala, & Ketil, 2011)—it is sufficient that just one of these aspects occurs to describe a 
family as being vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
2 Specific questions directed at experts cannot be asked without any adaptions to people who are neither involved 
in social science nor in policymaking. For instance, even using the term “vulnerability”—while no problem at all 
when talking to experts or policymakers—is difficult in conversations with (or a questionnaire addressed to) 
people not familiar with social science. (Note, however, that “vulnerability” has somewhat different meanings in 
different disciplines; e.g. psychology and economics. For more information see Hanappi, Bernardi, & Spini, 
2015.) In addition, questions that can hardly be mastered by non-experts (e.g. about future developments) were 
asked in the expert questionnaire only. 
 
3 We defined social exclusion to mean limited access to facilities such as shops, schools, libraries or medical 
services. 
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Experts in focus group discussions also presented various aspects of vulnerability as they 
discussed different reasons that families might need support for (cf. Mynarska et al., 2015). 
These discussions included the following aspects: 
1. Economic hardship, poverty; economic uncertainty, instability, fear about one’s own 
future; insufficient housing, low living standard; 
2. Social exclusion, lack of social networks (friends, family); 
3. Stigmatisation, disapproval from the society, discrimination by institutions and legal 
regulations; 
4. Time pressure, overwork, stress, being overburdened; negative consequences: health 
problems, depression, anxiety, behavioural and educational problems of children; 
5. Lack of family stability, risk of divorce, especially difficult situations for children  
(traumatic experiences, fights between parents etc.); 
6. Health problems, in particular disabilities; 
7. Violence, often related to the abuse of alcohol and other substances. 
 
For the expert questionnaire, we condensed this rich material. In line with existing definitions 
of vulnerability in the literature, we summarised these aspects under three dimensions of 
vulnerability as follows: Economic vulnerability refers to financial aspects. It covers poverty 
and economic hardship, e.g. the inability to pay for necessities, a low standard of living and 
limited access to public facilities. Psychological vulnerability includes strong feelings of 
stress, anxiety or depression. Such problems for children and families might be attributable to 
parents who are overburdened because of multiple workloads and conflicts between duties, or 
to conflicts within families, to child neglect or domestic violence. Social vulnerability 
comprises aspects such as stigmatisation, discrimination and a lack of social support. These 
three dimensions cover almost every aspect of vulnerability mentioned in focus group 
discussions and the literature. The necessity of disregarding specific aspects of vulnerability 
arose from limitations in the maximal length and scope of an online questionnaire. We chose 
physical health and disabilities to be omitted because forces like economic or cultural 
development in Europe are not assumed to affect them directly.4 These and similar main 
drivers identified in the focus group research, however, are at the centre of the current report. 
 
                                                 
4 However, it should be noticed that physical problems are of high relevance exactly because they often trigger 
economic, social and psychological problems (Olsson & Hwang, 2003). 
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2.3. Forces and drivers identified in previous research on family futures 
One of the main aims of the focus group research was to identify major factors (called 
“drivers”) influencing the future vulnerability of families with children. Starting points for 
group discussions were retrieved from existing foresight research, in particular from two 
family-related foresight projects that have been completed in the European context during the 
last few years. One of them was part of the OECD International Future Programme (OECD, 
2012b), the other belonged to the FamilyPlatform project (Kapella, de Liedekerke, & 
Bergeyck, 2011).5 Both discussed different scenarios of the future and their consequences for 
the situation of families. In describing these scenarios, they also explore various possible—
likely or unlikely—forthcoming developments. Developments mentioned are of economic, 
social, institutional, cultural as well as technological nature. It was assumed that they have 
consequences at the levels of the society, the economy, the labour market, the public sector, 
the care system, the family and the individual. 
 
From an analytic point of view, economic and cultural developments can be identified as key 
dimensions of change in previous foresight research.6 Therefore, a short outline of possible 
combinations of economic and cultural developments formed the introduction for the 
discussion of future changes in focus groups (see Mynarska et al., 2015). Focusing on the 
future of vulnerable families with children, the discussants considered various directions of 
macro-level developments and identified a number of drivers that might be important for the 
futures of vulnerable families. These factors can be grouped into four major categories of 
main forces: the economic development, changes in gender roles, factors influencing the 
reconciliation of work and family life, and broader cultural changes. Fifth, policy changes can 
be understood as a further relevant force because participants in focus groups often mentioned 
that social policy and/or family policy might modify the situation of vulnerable families to a 
large degree. 
 
                                                 
5 These projects have already been described in more details in previous Deliverables of Work Package 10 (see 
Deliverable 10.1: di Giulio et al., 2013; Deliverable 10.2: Philipov et al., 2014; Appendix I of Deliverable 10.4: 
Mynarska et al., 2015). 
 
6 All other changes can be somewhat crudely subsumed under one of these dimensions or are related to both of 
them. For instance, technological advances were understood to foster economic growth and, thus, enhancing 
economic prosperity. Certain advances might, however, also affect family life and, thus, cultural aspects like 
intergenerational relations. 
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In the literature, each of these five forces is directly related to at least one dimension of 
vulnerability. Economic development is obviously linked to the economic dimension of 
vulnerability. Economic expansion and contraction affect inequality as well as poverty (e.g. 
Danziger, Chavez, & Cumberworth, 2012; Jonsson, Mood, & Bihagen, 2013). Most 
importantly, positive (negative) economic development usually raises employment 
(unemployment) which in turn is a major determinant of exits from (entries into) poverty (e.g. 
McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2005; Moller et al., 2003). Indirect links to other dimensions of 
vulnerability are easily established. There is a stigma related to poverty that triggers social 
isolation and depression (e.g. Mickelson & Williams, 2008; Reutter et al., 2009). Economic 
hardship clearly fosters feelings of stress and lowers psychological well-being (e.g. Belle, 
1990; Belle & Doucet, 2003). Mediated by maternal depression, poverty can furthermore have 
harmful consequences on child development (e.g. Petterson & Albers, 2001). 
 
Changes in gender roles also seem to be related to all three dimensions of vulnerability. 
Gender roles prevailing in society do not only influence the position of women in the family 
but also in the labour market which in turn affects their economic position (Esping-Andersen, 
2009; Pfau-Effinger, 2000). Increasing female labour market participation testifies to the 
change in obsolete gender roles dictating that economic independence and providing for one’s 
family belong to the male domain (OECD, 2012a). However, the increasing footing of women 
in the labour market was not accompanied by a redistribution of the care responsibilities. 
Although there is evidence that fathers are getting increasingly involved with their children 
(Hobson & Fahlén, 2006; Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004; Raley, Bianchi, & 
Wang, 2012), the division of household tasks was shown to have changed only slightly in 
many countries (OECD, 2011b). As employed wives usually shoulder a larger share of family 
labour—comprising housework as well as care for children, disabled and elderly family 
members—than their spouses, women are hit hardest by the strains due to demands of their 
multiple roles at home and at the workplace (e.g. Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Grunow, Schulz, 
& Blossfeld, 2012; Poortman & Van der Lippe, 2009). Role strain and problems of work–
family reconciliation often lead to work–family conflict and stress affecting the health and 
general well-being of women (e.g. Allen et al., 2000; Byron, 2005; Frone, 2003; Greenhaus & 
Beutell, 1985). The division of family work and professional work between spouses, for 
example, is linked to relationship satisfaction and psychological well-being (e.g. Mikula, 
Riederer, & Bodi, 2008; Bodi, Mikula, & Riederer, 2010). Problems with balancing work and 
family life are also linked to economic vulnerability. Limited access to affordable and good 
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quality childcare, long-term care provisions, insufficient leaves or flexible working 
arrangements often result in a decision to leave the labour market or to reduce one’s working 
hours (Lilly, Laporte, & Coyte, 2007; OECD, 2007). The “care penalty” negatively affects the 
economic position of (especially) women and their economic standing over their life course as 
well as their pension rights (Evandrou & Glasser, 2003). 
 
Apart from changes in gender roles, a bulk of broader cultural changes affected intimate 
relationships in the past and thus also the social and other dimensions of vulnerability: 
Liberalisation of norms and processes of individualization resulted in a huge diversity of 
lifestyles and family forms in today's society. Intergenerational relations changed as 
independence of children from their parents increased. Technological progress allowed for the 
development of new forms of communication often replacing direct face-to-face interaction 
(e.g. time spent in the internet). Urbanisation was on the rise and transformations of the social 
environment changed the meaning of the home. As a consequence, values and norms 
regarding family life also changed. For instance, shifts in childrearing norms had an impact on 
parenting behaviour. In general, cultural changes affected ties between people, relationships 
within families and emotional attachments between children and parents. 
 
Best known are the consequences of the increasing fragility of romantic relationships. Divorce 
and parental conflict stemming from union dissolution of parents has been shown to influence 
both parents and children negatively. The quality of parent–child relationships, perceived 
social support from others and anxiety in personal relationships have been associated with 
parental conflict, thus leading to both social and psychological vulnerability of children in 
young adulthood (Riggio, 2004). Further changes in family forms related to adverse 
experiences such as the death of a parent or another family member has been linked to 
depression (Dalgard et al., 2006). However, divorce has replaced parental death as the leading 
cause for single parenthood (Bygren, Gähler, & Nermo, 2004). Children of divorced parents 
generally fare worse in terms of emotional and educational outcomes although the effects are, 
on average, small or modest (Garriga & Härkönen, 2009), and they are already present before 
the divorce (Sanz-de-Galdeano & Vuri, 2007). Despite a variation in the economic 
consequences of divorce for children and parents, it is one of the main life events leading to 
poverty, and thus to economic vulnerability (Callens & Croux, 2009). Problems to achieve an 
acceptable work-family balance and dissatisfaction with their living conditions are usually 
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more pronounced for single-parent families (Avramov, 2002). Stress and a lack of social 
support are major reasons for depression in single mothers (Cairney et al., 2003). 
 
Further research needs to be undertaken to explain the relationship between changing family 
forms and vulnerability, including the highly relevant questions how social support and 
emotional ties are affected. It has to be acknowledged, however, that claims about the 
disappearance of “the (nuclear) family”, rising problems in building up emotional bonds and a 
weakening of solidarity in societies in general have been continuously raised from the 1970s 
onwards (e.g. Claessens, 1979; Lasch, 1978; Sennet, 1977). Not all researchers share such 
pessimistic diagnoses (e.g. Leary, 2001; Haller, 2005). In addition, viewed from a historical 
perspective the welfare state has continually taken over duties and responsibilities from 
individuals and their families. Acknowledging the changing family landscape, future research 
should address how social policies contribute to children’s and parents’ adjustments to 
adverse family events. 
 
Finally, policies play an important role. Though social welfare programs and other policy 
measures are often criticised for not being effective enough, welfare states can reduce poverty 
by a substantial degree (for both, criticism and effects, see Cantillon & Vandenbroucke, 2014; 
Nelson, 2013; Kenworthy, 1999). In countries like Denmark or Ireland, for instance, social 
transfers reduce poverty rates by more than half (see EAPN, 2014; Verwiebe, 2015). Research 
of Fouarge and Layte (2005) shows that the level of long-term poverty varies considerably 
between different welfare state regimes (see also Mau & Verwiebe, 2010). In addition, a 
report by UNICEF (2014) concludes that the impact of the latest economic crisis on the well-
being of children has been profoundly shaped by the already existing social safety net and 
policy responses to the economic downturn. Aiming at consolidating public finances, cuts in 
public welfare may harm vulnerable families in times of austerity. 
 
2.4. Policies and the reproduction of vulnerability within families 
Vulnerability is often passed on from parents to their children. Individuals who grow up in 
families where members suffer from vulnerability are at risk of starting families of their own 
that are affected by vulnerability as well. Experts participating in focus group discussion also 
talked about policy measures which—in their opinion—would be crucial to prevent the 
“reproduction of vulnerability” from one generation to another. First, reconciliation policies 
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were seen as a central aspect of any political strategy to counteract vulnerability. Parents need 
both sufficient financial resources and enough time to care for their children. Second, experts 
discussed how social support services for those most disadvantaged could be improved. Third, 
financial transfers were understood as necessary to address the most urgent needs of 
vulnerable families. However, it became clear in the focus group discussions that monetary 
benefits and support services alone would not solve the problem of reproduction of 
vulnerability. One key challenge for the future is to help vulnerable families not only 
temporarily—by mitigating the most urgent needs—but to improve their situation in a 
sustainable manner. In all five focus groups participants strongly emphasised the importance 
of education in this respect. Education was furthermore very widely defined to include 
education of children, parents, employers and the society as a whole (for details see Mynarska 
et al., 2015). 
 
The literature on education and the reproduction of inequality, however, is not very 
conclusive. On the one hand, education is argued to offer the most important way to overcome 
disadvantages of social heritage because it affects people’s “subsequent life chances—their 
occupational and economic attainments as well as their health and longevity” (Shavit, Yaish, 
& Bar-Haim, 2007, p. 37). On the other hand, however, “educational attainment is largely 
determined by the characteristics of people’s social origins” (ibid.). Research repeatedly 
demonstrated that parental occupation and education are powerful predictors of students’ 
educational achievement (e.g. Lytton & Pyryt, 1998; Marks, 2005; 2008; Rothon, 2007; 
Verwiebe & Riederer, 2013). 
 
Nobel laureate Gary S. Becker (1993, p. 21) notes in his book on human capital that family 
affects children’s “knowledge, skills, values, and habits”. All these factors, in turn, influence 
educational performance of students. If children from higher strata who begin schooling with 
an advantage achieve superior certificates and higher status positions than students from 
lower strata, the educational system indeed administers the reproduction of inequality. 
According to the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1973; 1984), in particular higher 
education serves as a means to reproduce existing social stratification. For Bourdieu, 
children’s cultural capital is decisive for social mobility as habituation to educational contents 
and conformity with the respective cultural codes (elite behaviour) is rewarded in and by 
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schools.7 Research has also repeatedly shown that children’s chances of educational success 
depend on their parents’ cultural capital (e.g. Andersen & Hansen, 2012; Barone, 2006; 
Jaeger, 2009; Verwiebe & Riederer, 2013). 
  
                                                 
7 Cultural capital refers to transmissible parental cultural codes, practices and competencies (e.g. style of speech, 
physical appearance). Children become familiar with specific dispositions in their early years during 
socialisation processes. 
 17 
 
Following the work of Boudon (1974), other authors highlight aspects such as educational 
choices, costs of education and class-specific educational risks (e.g. Breen & Goldthorpe, 
1997; Breen, van de Werfhorst, & Jæger, 2014). According to this perspective, people from 
lower strata, on the one hand, might be concerned mostly about costs (enrolment fees etc.) 
and opportunity costs of education (foregone earnings). The educational choices for their 
children may thus be highly dependent on risk aversion. Parents with privileged 
socioeconomic background, on the other hand, usually perceive investments in education 
being the best alternative to maintain a high family status. As they are afraid of downward 
mobility, they will send their children to the best schools and support their children to 
graduate (even if the risk of failure is relatively high). Choices made by parents are especially 
relevant in highly stratified educational systems where early tracking is the rule 
(Allmendinger, 1989; Schneider, 2008). In systems with early selection, thus, children from 
lower social classes are less likely to attend secondary or post-secondary schools (e.g. Duru-
Bellat, Kieffer, & Reimer, 2008; Kristen, 2000). 
 
Discussants in our focus groups seem to acknowledge these arguments at least implicitly. This 
might be one reason why they think of education in very broad terms. For example, they 
highlight the necessity of early childhood education to overcome disadvantages, the relevance 
of high-quality education for all students and the need to support parents with information and 
advice when it comes to taking decisions about the schooling of their children. All these 
measures together should at least improve the chances of children from underprivileged 
educational backgrounds and might indeed hinder the reproduction of vulnerability. 
 
Before the concrete aims of the present research and the applied methods are discussed, the 
next section presents some data on (economic) vulnerability of families, educational mobility 
and the reproduction of inequality. First, it gives an overview of the past development 
concerning shares of vulnerable families across Europe. Second, it describes the effect of 
parental background on economic vulnerability and intergenerational mobility in education. 
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3. Past development of vulnerability in Europe—an overview 
3.1. Vulnerability of families with children 
Vulnerability is a complex theoretical construct. It is extremely challenging to measure the 
economic, psychological and social dimension of vulnerability. International comparisons are 
usually based on economic vulnerability. The European Union uses the concept of “being at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion” to evaluate vulnerability. This refers to the situation of 
people either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a household with 
very low work intensity (for details see Appendix I).8 In this respect, material needs are the 
key indicator of vulnerability. 
 
If we look at the aggregate of the populations of European Union member states, a quarter of 
people is currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion (Eurostat database). This is 
approximately the same share of people as ten years ago. Ignoring individual entries into and 
exits from poverty, the overall share of people being at such risk has remained rather constant. 
Another aspect that did not noticeably change is the difference in rates between age groups  
(cf. López Vilaplana, 2013): while only one-fifth of the elderly population (aged 65 or over) 
are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the number among children (aged below 17) reaches 
27 per cent. Minors may be exposed to vulnerability most frequently. 
 
Experts participating in the workshop were right to shift the attention towards the situation of 
children (Philipov et al., 2014). Within Europe, however, the share of children affected by 
poverty and exclusion risks varies dramatically across countries (see Appendix I, Table A.1). 
In 2013/14, the highest share of children at such risk could be found in Bulgaria (52 per cent) 
and the lowest in Norway (13 per cent). Norway had already registered the lowest risk for 
children about ten years ago (14 per cent in 2004/05). In general, welfare states in northern 
Europe reduce poverty and social exclusion among children to a large extent (shares are 
within a range of 13–17 per cent). Similar low shares of children at risk, however, can also be 
found in a number of central European countries like the Netherlands or Switzerland (17 per 
cent in 2013/14). Poverty and social exclusion among children is much higher in most 
                                                 
8 It has to be noted that “social exclusion” in AROPE is not equal to the concept of “social vulnerability” defined 
above. The AROPE concept does not cover all aspects of social exclusion but refers primarily to enforced lacks 
in terms of resources not allowing full social participation (problems of affordability). For details see Appendix 
I; for more information see Eurostat (2012). 
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southern European countries where shares of children at risk lie around 30 per cent—with a 
remarkable increase in the last decade in Greece from 25 per cent to 38 per cent. In some 
eastern European countries, almost half of children are hit by poverty and exclusion (Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Romania). 
 
Looking at the target group of the current research, families with children, the figures are very 
similar (Table 1). The share of households with dependent children at such risks ranges from 
11 per cent in Norway to 47 per cent in Macedonia.9 In most countries, risks remained quite 
stable over time. However, in some countries there was a huge decline over the last decade (in 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) while in other countries, mostly 
those affected most by the economic crisis of 2008, shares of families with dependent children 
at risk increased (esp. Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, Malta). Together, a deterioration of the 
situation of families with children in some of the old Member States of the European Union 
and improvements in several of the new Member States lead to a more or less constant 
aggregate share of households with dependent children who are at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion between 2004/05 and 2013/14. 
 
What types of families create particularly difficult conditions for children? In prior research, 
experts identified large families and especially single-parent families to be more vulnerable 
than other family types (Mynarska et al., 2015; Philipov et al., 2014). Several experts did not 
assume that the family type itself affected vulnerability directly. Nevertheless, work–family 
reconciliation was perceived to be harder if only one parent was available and/or there were 
more children to care for. Problems of work–family reconciliation, in turn, were said to raise 
the risk of vulnerability. Indeed, in most European countries the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion is extremely high for single-parent families. In EU-28, about half of all single adults 
with dependent children are currently at such risk—figures vary between 34 per cent in 
Finland and 79 per cent in Macedonia (for more details see Appendix I, Table A.2).10 With 
                                                 
9 Children in the prior paragraph referred to individuals below age 16 while the concept of “dependent children” 
includes all individuals below age 18 and even older individuals until age 24 in case they are economically 
inactive and living with at least one parent. 
 
10 Again, it can be observed that the chances of single-parent households have improved in several new Member 
States over time. However, an opposing development in some of the old Member States has cancelled out this 
improvement of the situation of single parents in the aggregate. 
 
 20 
 
regard to  
 
 21 
 
Table 1: Households with dependent children at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
% of households 2004–05 2009–10 2013–14 
Central western Europe    
Austria 17 19 19 
Belgium 20 19 20 
Germany 17 18 18 
France 18 20 20 
Luxembourg 19 21 23 
Netherlands 17 15 15 
Switzerland - 18 15 
Western Europe    
Ireland 24 29 32 
United Kingdom 27 25 30 
Northern Europe    
Denmark 13 13 14 
Finland 14 13 12 
Iceland 13 12 13 
Norway 12 12 11 
Sweden 14 13 14 
Southern Europe    
Cyprus 20 19 27 
Greece 27 29 39 
Italy 27 27 31 
Malta 20 23 28 
Portugal 25 25 29 
Spain 26 29 31 
Central eastern Europe    
Czech Republic 22 15 15 
Hungary 34 34 37 
Poland 46 28 27 
Slovenia 15 14 17 
Slovakia 32 21 22 
Baltic Countries    
Estonia 24 21 21 
Latvia 42 36 33 
Lithuania 39 30 30 
South eastern Europe    
Bulgaria - 44 46 
Croatia - 29 27 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - - 47 
Romania - 44 44 
Serbia - - 41 
Selected Aggregates    
European Union (27 countries) 26 25 26 
Old Member States (15 countries) 21 23 25 
New Member States (12 countries) 41 31 32 
European Union (28 countries) - 25 26 
Note: The rate shown is the average rate or the rate for the only available year, respectively. 
Source: Eurostat (2015; data from EU SILC). 
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Large families (households with two adults and three or more dependent children), we 
observe the most pronounced differences between European countries: Only eight per cent of 
large families in Norway are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, while respective shares 
peak with 90 per cent in Bulgaria. Aggregated, 32 per cent of large families in EU-28 were at 
such risk in 2013/14 (see Appendix I, Table A.3). 
 
3.2. Reproduction of vulnerability, intergenerational mobility and education 
Although the discussion about educational expansion and its consequences for inequality has 
been an ongoing one for decades, it is difficult to present meaningful data on the reproduction 
of vulnerability and the role of education. While liberal theorists of modernisation thought 
that increasing equality of opportunity will go along with high rates of social upward 
mobility, Marxists argued that the spread of routine non-skilled employment would lead to 
proletarianisation and downward mobility. Both groups of scholars seemed to be wrong 
(Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Hout & DiPrete, 2006). In retrospect, the period of economic 
growth after World War II has changed the face of Europe:11 the living standard of all social 
classes significantly improved although inequality was not diminishing. If all parts of the 
population advance one or two steps higher, differences between them still exist. 
 
The situation with regard to education seems to be similar to the general development of 
inequality. While some authors argued that in most countries inequality still persists (e.g. 
Pfeffer, 2008; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993), others find a decline for the differences in 
educational opportunities (e.g. Ballarino et al., 2009; Breen et al., 2009; Esping-Andersen & 
Wagner, 2012), and still other papers remain inconclusive (e.g. Breen & Jonsson, 2005; 
Shavit et al., 2007). The chances of children from working-class households attaining a high-
school diploma or a university degree have improved in western societies in recent decades, 
but not as strongly as might have been expected (Müller & Kogan, 2010). The most 
convincing explanation may be the following: education has become affordable for more and 
more people thanks to lower fees and the extended provision of scholarships. With higher 
                                                 
11 The decades after World War II brought rising living standards, a redistribution of income by the welfare state 
as well as better nutrition and health for lower classes. This period even has its own names, being called les 
Trente Glorieuses in French (standing for “the glorious thirty” years between 1945 and 1975) or 
Wirtschaftswunder in German (meaning “economic miracle”—also known as “The Miracle on the Rhine” in the 
English literature). 
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educated populations and technological development, however, the societal standards have 
also changed.12 Inequality is reproduced at other educational levels nowadays than in the past. 
The declining of educational inequalities at lower levels has not avoided distinction at higher 
levels (Shavit et al., 2007; Esping-Andersen & Wagner, 2012; Blossfeld, Blossfeld, & 
Blossfeld, 2015). 
 
Using SILC data on 27 European countries, Bellani and Bia (2016) found that childhood 
poverty reduced probabilities of completing secondary education and thus has a detrimental 
effect on income as an adult. Even in their most conservative scenario growing up poor 
decreased later income on average by five per cent which in turn lead to a four percentage 
points higher poverty risk. In general, lower intergenerational mobility is associated with 
higher inequality (Causa & Johansson, 2010; Corak, 2013). Especially Nordic countries show 
both low levels of income inequality and high levels of intergenerational mobility (Corak, 
2013). By contrast, southern European countries appear to be rather immobile (Causa & 
Johansson, 2010).13 Table 2 gives an overview of differences in educational mobility in 
Europe. 
 
In 2012, in European countries between 39 (Finland) and 71 (Czech Republic) per cent of 
non-students aged 35 to 44 years and between 44 (Ireland) and 71 (Czech Republic) per cent 
of non-students aged 25 to 34 years completed an educational level equivalent to that of their 
parents. These numbers demonstrate rather huge differences in educational mobility across 
European countries. With regard to (economic) vulnerability, however, intergenerational 
immobility in education is less problematic in countries with highly educated populations than 
in countries with less educated populations. In Finland, Ireland and the Czech Republic the 
shares of adults within this age range who completed at least upper secondary education are 
rather high. Especially in southern Europe, the percentage of adults within these two age 
                                                 
12 For instance, much more education is needed for working-class jobs today than in the past. 
 
13 According to Causa and Johansson (2010), first, the wage advantage of growing up in a highly educated 
family is strongest in southern Europe, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Ireland. Second, the link between 
the earnings of parents and those of their children is strongest in the United Kingdom, Italy and France. Third, 
the link between parental socio-economic status and student achievement is strongest in France and Belgium. 
Finally, a highly educated family background is most important for chances of completing tertiary education in 
Luxembourg and Italy, but also highly relevant in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland. 
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groups who completed upper secondary or tertiary education is comparatively low (see 
Table 2).14 
 
Table 2: Educational attainment and intergenerational mobility in education 
Age group 35–44 year old non-students 25–34 year old non-students 
(% of country) 
at least upper 
secondary 
education 
downward 
mobility 
status  
quo 
upward 
mobility 
at least upper 
secondary 
education 
downward 
mobility 
status  
quo 
upward 
mobility 
Central western 
Europe 
        
Austria 86 15 55 30 90 21 48 36 
Belgium* 80 11 45 44 82 13 52 35 
Germany 87 19 62 19 87 24 57 19 
France 81 7 45 47 85 10 50 40 
Netherlands 80 12 44 44 85 17 45 38 
Western Europe         
Ireland 86 8 45 47 90 12 44 45 
United Kingdom** 82 14 49 37 86 16 51 33 
Northern Europe         
Denmark 84 18 49 33 82 18 54 28 
Finland 90 7 39 54 90 15 46 39 
Norway 86 16 49 35 81 27 51 22 
Sweden 86 20 40 39 82 28 47 24 
Southern Europe         
Italy 65 5 59 36 74 5 49 45 
Spain 65 7 48 45 66 10 49 41 
Central eastern 
and Baltic 
Countries 
 
   
    
Estonia 89 18 48 34 89 27 50 23 
Czech Republic 96 11 71 18 95 12 71 17 
Poland 93 6 56 39 94 7 57 36 
Slovakia 94 7 65 28 92 10 67 23 
Note: The reported percentage of adults who completed at least upper secondary education refers to 2013 (France) or 2014. 
Mobility data refers to non-students in 2012. Downward (upward) mobility means that the educational attainment of children is 
lower (higher) than that of their parents; “status quo” is given when their level of educational attainment is equivalent to their 
parents’ educational level. * Mobility data refer to Flanders only. ** Mobility data refer to England and Northern Ireland only. 
Source: OECD (2015a, p. 40); mobility data from Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC) 2012, OECD (2015a, p. 86). 
 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows results of Whelan, Nolan and Maître (2013) demonstrating effects of 
parental background on the economic vulnerability of adult children. In all ten countries under 
                                                 
14 Caution definitively needs to be exercised in interpreting the comparison between the two age groups in terms 
of changes over time. Nevertheless, in Italy both upward mobility and the share of adults with at least upper 
secondary education are larger in the younger age group than in the older age group. This might indicate a 
positive trend. In Finland, on the other hand, where 90 per cent of adults in both age groups have completed 
upper secondary or tertiary education, a decline in upward mobility does not necessarily produce higher risks of 
vulnerability. 
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study except Denmark, children of parents in elementary occupations are characterised by 
higher risks of economic vulnerability than children of parents with highly skilled non-manual 
occupations. Differences between those two are biggest in the southern and eastern European 
countries (Italy: 33 vs. 12 per cent, Slovakia: 30 vs. 14, Estonia: 27 vs. 11, Spain: 25 vs. 9). 
 
In addition, adults who experienced bad economic circumstances in their family of origin as 
teenagers are at higher risks of economic vulnerability in all countries considered. Differences 
are biggest in Ireland, Italy and Spain and smallest in Austria, Finland and the UK. Both 
welfare states and higher intergenerational mobility are likely to affect these outcomes. 
Considering the joint impact of parents’ class and childhood economic circumstances on 
economic vulnerability, a sharp contrast between social-democratic northern welfare states 
and the southern European countries and Ireland becomes visible (Whelan et al., 2013). 
 
Table 3: Economic vulnerability by parental background in Europe 
Heritage: Parental  social class 
Childhood economic 
circumstances 
Region/ Nation higher non-manual 
lower non-
manual 
skilled 
manual 
elementary 
occupations good bad 
Central western Europe       
Austria 8 7 9 15 8 14 
France 13 15 16 22 14 24 
Western Europe       
Ireland 10 13 18 22 11 38 
United Kingdom 11 12 15 16 13 19 
Northern Europe       
Denmark 9 7 6 5 7 15 
Finland 9 8 11 14 10 16 
Southern Europe       
Italy 12 16 21 33 14 31 
Spain 9 14 18 25 14 31 
Central eastern Europe  
and Baltic countries    
   
Estonia 11 9 17 27 16 25 
Slovakia 14 21 25 30 19 27 
Note: The measure of economic vulnerability was developed using latent-class analysis with three indicators: (a) income 
poverty, (b) consumption deprivation and (c) economic stress (cf. Whelan et al., 2013, p. 91). Childhood economic 
circumstances were operationalised using subjective assessments of financial problems in the parental household when the 
interviewee was a young teenager. Circumstances are defined as “good” if families experienced “never” or at most 
“occasionally” severe financial problems in their childhood (and as “bad” if the answer was “often” or even “most of the time”; 
cf. Whelan et al., 2013, p. 85). 
Source: Whelan et al. (2013, pp. 95f.) using data from EU-SILC 2005. 
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Overall, available scientific evidence confirms the relevance of the issue of intergenerational 
transmission of (economic) vulnerability already pointed out by participants in the stakeholder 
workshop (see Philipov et al., 2014). As long as intergenerational mobility is not sufficiently 
raised, the reproduction of vulnerability should at least be on the agenda of those European 
countries with high numbers of child poverty. In focus groups, discussants in different 
European countries focused on education as a primary means to reduce the reproduction of 
disadvantages by families. The expert questionnaire addressed the question of useful policies 
again. 
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4. Research aims, data and methods 
4.1. Research questions 
Section 3 reported past trends and depicted the current state of vulnerability of families in 
children, intergenerational transmission of education and reproduction of inequality in 
Europe. Poverty and social exclusion refer to the economic dimension of vulnerability. At 
first glance, it seems that economic vulnerability has remained constant in Europe during the 
last decade. A closer look, however, revealed that there were positive as well as negative 
developments in different European countries. Differences in welfare states, period of EU 
membership and effects of the economic crisis might be factors behind these past 
developments. In addition, Section 3 demonstrated that the reproduction of vulnerability is an 
issue of high current relevance. As poverty among children is common in several European 
countries it can be easily argued that stopping the intergenerational transmission of 
vulnerability should be of great interest for European policymakers. What will future 
developments look like? What factors might drive the future of vulnerable families in Europe? 
Which drivers could affect which dimension(s) of vulnerability? What might stop the 
reproduction of vulnerability in a way that higher risks are no longer passed on from one 
generation to the next? We conducted our expert survey to contribute some answers to these 
questions. 
 
In focus groups, we asked for the expertise of persons who were directly or indirectly 
involved in policymaking. We argued that policymakers and stakeholders might give attention 
to other aspects than scientists because they are experts who are working on more concrete 
problems and practical issues. In the expert questionnaire, we still included policymakers and 
stakeholders but also scientists as well as practitioners working with vulnerable families. How 
will these different groups assess the future effects of possible drivers upon the vulnerability 
of families with children? How will this more broadly defined group of experts evaluate 
policy measures to stop the intergenerational transmission of vulnerability? The conducted 
online questionnaire could give some hints to what degree opinions and suggestions of 
different groups of experts differ. 
 
Below we present the chosen empirical and analytical methods, arguing their advantages and 
limitations. After a short discussion of the research method, we outline the construction and 
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design of the questionnaire, followed in the subsequent parts of Section 4 by a description of 
the characteristics of respondents and an outline of the analyses. 
4.2. Research method 
The expert survey sought to gather information regarding estimates of future vulnerability of 
families with children as well as its underlying determinants (drivers) in European countries. 
The questionnaire designed is building on the main results of the focus group study. In this 
respect, the expert questionnaire aims at “quantifying” the qualitative results of the prior 
research. 
 
Focus groups give detailed information about informants’ perspectives and opinions. They 
were well-suited to reveal the practitioners’ subjective perspectives and allowed to explore 
ambivalences in meanings and views. But opinions expressed in focus groups cannot be used 
as a measure of consensus and consensus does not always imply general relevance (cf. 
Bryman & Bell, 2011; Sim, 1998). There is not necessarily a close relationship between the 
apparent importance of an issue within a specific group discussion and its general importance. 
Furthermore, only a small number of experts can participate in focus group discussions. The 
expert survey conducted online should overcome some of these limitations of focus groups. 
 
In general, an online survey has both advantages and disadvantages (see Bryman & Bell, 
2011; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). First of all, an online survey is cheaper and (once 
implemented) easier to administer than face-to-face or telephone surveys. Thus, most 
importantly, our online survey allowed gathering opinions of a higher number of experts from 
more European countries than in focus groups. With more participants, results should have 
much more power. There are, however, other advantages that might be more relevant with 
regard to our expert survey. For instance, the structured questionnaire allowed to ask each and 
every participant about the relevance of the identified forces as possible drivers of future 
vulnerability. Using rating scales to assess future developments or policies, a quantification of 
our qualitative results became possible. According to leading psychologists, “prospection” is 
an extremely difficult task (see Gilbert, 2006; Kahneman, 2011). Even for experts, it is hard to 
anticipate (all) future developments and imagine future states in sufficient detail to answer 
concrete questions. Experts facing serious difficulties might need time to think about answers 
and probably would not want to show their uncertainty to others. In our online survey they did 
not have to disclose their assessments directly to another person and could even choose to 
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remain completely anonymous if they wanted to. Furthermore, experts could answer the 
questions at their own pace and schedule. If necessary, they could pause the survey several 
times and resume it later (whenever they had time to continue). 
 
Major limitations of online questionnaires include the absence of interviewees providing 
support to participants if they do not understand questions properly, the low degree of control 
of who participates in internet surveys and usually low response rates. To anticipate problems 
resulting from the absence of interviewees, we did several feedback rounds and pre-tests to 
avoid misunderstanding in advance. Moreover, e-mail contact could be used to send questions 
to the authors of this deliverable. Although it is technically feasible, restricting access to the 
survey in a way to allow absolute control over participants was not possible due to conflicting 
aims of anonymity and confidentiality. Minimising the risk of getting participants who were 
not experts, we sent out invitations via e-mail only and included questions about the 
background of participants and their fields of expertise in the survey. 
 
The problem of low response was addressed by sending invitations via organisations and 
scientific associations where experts of interest were members. Experts have usually busy 
schedules and invitations are easily deleted from brimful mailboxes. Invitations sent by well-
known colleagues and important institutions should raise the commitment to participate in the 
study. Nevertheless, the sampling of experts is the “Achilles’ heel” of the present research. 
Unfortunately, lists of experts providing a sampling frame necessary to conduct random 
sampling were not available. Thus, our sample of experts is not representative. When 
interpreting the data, we have to bear in mind that caution is necessary and the validity of our 
conclusions may still be limited. On the whole, however, the expert questionnaire clearly is an 
important step forward in foresight research. 
 
4.3. Construction process, structure of the expert questionnaire and data collection 
In the process of questionnaire construction (July-November 2015), we had several feedback 
rounds. The first drafts of the questionnaire were content of intensive discussions with nine 
scientists familiar with family topics and/or empirical social research. After implementing the 
questionnaire online, a pre-test was conducted inviting selected colleagues via e-mail (19 
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participated).15 Next, a draft of the expert questionnaire was sent out to all work package 
leaders of the FamiliesAndSocieties project. After additional adjustments of the questionnaire, 
data collection started in early December 2015 and ended in early March 2016. Invitations 
were mainly spread among experts by several cooperating institutions and associations that 
encouraged their members to participate in the online questionnaire (for the content of the 
invitation see Appendix II).16 Some of them kindly sent reminders to their members a few 
weeks after our invitation was submitted for the first time. In addition, personal contacts of 
the authors to colleagues were also used to further enhance participation. Some selected 
contacts were even asked to distribute the invitation among their networks (snowball 
sampling). 
 
The questionnaire17 itself was structured as follows: First, participants could choose the 
country their answers would refer to. If participants wanted to complete the questionnaire for 
more than one country, they had the opportunity to follow a link at the end of the 
questionnaire. Second, experts had to choose one of three discussed dimensions of 
vulnerability (economic, psychological or social vulnerability). They were invited to answer 
with regard to another dimension of their choice later in the questionnaire. In principle, our 
informants could answer for as many European countries and dimensions of vulnerability 
(one, two or all three) as they liked. Thus, the participants themselves controlled the length of 
the survey. The questionnaire was designed so that completion in its shortest version (for one 
country and one dimension of vulnerability) should not exceed 20 minutes.18 
 
After the decisions for one European country and one dimension of vulnerability were taken, 
participants were, third, confronted with fifteen drivers belonging to five different major 
forces. Participants were now asked to estimate the future development of a specific driver in 
                                                 
15 Online implementation was done using the Lime Survey software package (see www.limesurvey.org). 
 
16 Those who spread information about our survey were Population Europe, IFFD, COFACE, ESA RN 13 
(Families and Intimate Lives), ISA RC 28 (Social Stratification and Mobility), ISA RC 6 (Family Research) and 
the project coordinator who sent invitations to stakeholders of the project on behalf of the FamiliesAndSocieties 
consortium. Other institutions that were also contacted did not reply to our request. 
 
17 The structure of the questionnaire is explained in more detail in Appendix II. There we also quote a link to a 
deactivated version of the survey so that interested readers are able to click through it. 
 
18 The median of the actual amount of time participating experts needed lies between 20 and 21 minutes. The 
quickest completed the questionnaire within 10 to 14 minutes while others needed more than one hour. However, 
several experts answered for more than one dimension of vulnerability which increases the time needed to 
complete the questionnaire substantially. 
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the chosen country and its impact on the future development of the chosen dimension of 
vulnerability, respectively. These drivers are listed in Appendix II and will be presented in the 
main text in the results section. Fourth, experts were requested to report estimates of the 
future development of vulnerability and had to assess the relevance of each of the five forces 
on this development. Next, we asked for additional (local) aspects researchers might have to 
consider with regard to the future of vulnerable families in Europe and for possible influences 
of the current flow of displaced persons (refugees). Fifth, participants were instructed to 
consider all three dimensions of vulnerability and assess how important ten listed policy 
measures would be if the government wanted to prevent children from inheriting vulnerability 
from their families of origin (for details see again Appendix II). Finally, experts were 
requested to express their (dis)agreement with four popular opinions referring to family 
and/or policy aspects and to give some personal information. While participants usually had 
to supply answers to proceed with the questionnaire, in this final part single items could be 
skipped. 
 
4.4. Expert questionnaire sample description 
Altogether, we used 203 assessments of future vulnerability developments from 175 
questionnaires that were completed by at least 162 experts.19 This is comparable to existing 
research in demography using expert surveys (e.g. segments of the IIASA-Oxford online 
questionnaire, see Lutz, Butz, & KC, 2014).20 In some questionnaires, experts chose to make 
assessments for two or three dimensions of vulnerability (17 and 5 questionnaires, 
respectively). One expert made assessments for two countries. Altogether, we got assessments 
for 29 European countries. About half of the experts revealed their full name (49 per cent) and 
the majority of those who identified themselves agreed to be listed in the Appendix of this 
report (68 per cent; see Appendix III). 
 
                                                 
19 Questionnaires not explicitly submitted by participants were excluded from the analyses. In total, 176 
questionnaires were submitted but experts did not always identify themselves. Therefore the number of experts 
cannot be assessed with precision. Only two assessments obviously referred to the same person. In this case, the 
first of the two assessments was deleted (the second was filled out directly after the first one). 
 
20 Basten, Sobotka and Zeman (2013, p. 50) report 184 assessments by approximately 170 experts for the low-
fertility module of the survey. 
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The majority of experts came from an academic background (61 per cent). Almost one-fifth of 
participants worked for NGOs. Six per cent regarded themselves as policymakers. Around 13 
per cent of participants did not assign themselves to one of these three sectors. These experts 
worked for administrative authorities, regional or (inter)national organisations, in the health, 
educational or private sector (business, industry or banking). Some of them were mainly 
practitioners but were also involved in research and/or policy.   
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Among academics, the most prominent disciplines were sociology (mentioned 27 times), 
demography (13), economics (10) and psychology (7). A large number of academics, 
however, characterised themselves just as “social scientists” without any specific 
denomination. Dominant research interests referred to the following topics: family (incl. 
fertility), childhood (incl. child development), education, inequality (incl. poverty and 
stratification) and gender. Participants working in the area of policymaking were mainly 
engaged in family policy. One expert each also mentioned labour market policies, youth 
policy or welfare policy. Finally, participants worked for NGOs focussing on parents and 
parenting, education, children, gender issues or specific family forms (e.g. rainbow families, 
single-parent families, large families). 
 
The 203 assessments of future vulnerability developments referred to three different 
dimensions of vulnerability: economic vulnerability was covered by 76 assessments, social 
vulnerability by 75 and psychological vulnerability by 52. For ten countries five or more 
experts provided assessments, with Austria being the most frequently considered country (29 
assessments) by far, followed by Italy (20), Spain (17), Germany (14), France (13) and 
Sweden (11). For analyses, countries were grouped to form six European regions. This was 
necessary to have enough cases for regional comparisons. Table 4 gives more detailed 
information. 
 
Table 4: Regions and number of assessments 
Region Countries included (n) Total N (%) Economic vulnerability 
Psychological 
vulnerability 
Social 
vulnerability 
Central  
western Europe 
Belgium (7), France (13),  
Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (9) 30 (17) 7 14 15 
German-speaking 
part of Europe 
Austria (29), Germany (14),  
Switzerland (3) 46 (26) 15 14 21 
Western Europe Northern Ireland (1), Ireland (3),  United Kingdom (7) 11 (6) 6 2 4 
Northern Europe Denmark (2), Finland (3),  Norway (5), Sweden (11) 21 (12) 13 1 10 
Southern Europe Cyprus (1), Greece (1), Italy (20),  Portugal (1), Spain (17) 40 (23) 22 11 13 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria (4), Czech Republic (3),  
Estonia (2), Hungary (4), Lithuania (1),  
Macedonia (1), Poland (1),  
Romania (7), Russia (3), Slovenia (2) 
28 (16) 13 10 12 
Note: The total number of vulnerability assessments can be higher than the number of assessments for regions as experts could 
answer for more than one dimension of vulnerability. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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The composition of expert groups was similar across most regions. As for the experts on 
central western Europe, the German-speaking countries, northern Europe, southern Europe 
and eastern Europe, the shares of scientists varied between 57 and 65 per cent. Only in 
western Europe were the majority of experts practitioners (only 36 per cent scientists). 
 
4.5. Strategy of the analysis 
Analyses in the current report will be of descriptive character. Usually tables and figures show 
the distribution of answers given (percentages) or average ratings (means). First, Section 5.1 
presents the experts’ assessments of future developments of vulnerability. Participants 
estimated how shares of vulnerable families will develop in the periods from 2015 to 2020 
and from 2020 to 2050, respectively. Second, Section 5.2 reports the respondents’ opinions on 
forces affecting future vulnerability of families with children. Analysing different aspects of 
these five major forces, fifteen drivers will be discussed—with regard to their estimated future 
development and their impact on vulnerability. Correlation coefficients between estimated 
developments of drivers and assumed consequences for future vulnerability show whether 
experts expect the same associations between drivers and vulnerability to hold. All of the 
analyses described so far will furthermore distinguish between the three defined dimensions 
of vulnerability (economic, psychological and social vulnerability). 
 
Finally, Section 5.3 is devoted to the estimated effectiveness of policies. In our online 
questionnaire, experts assessed the relevance of ten specific policies in mitigating the 
reproduction of vulnerability within families. Participants in the focus group discussions 
perceived these policies to be necessary. The results of the expert questionnaire will show 
whether a broader group of experts shared their opinion. A comparison between the mean 
ratings of different measures may furthermore establish a hierarchy of measures, thus 
identifying a group of policies that might deserve priority. 
 
Our analyses will differentiate between regions of Europe whenever feasible for at least two 
reasons. First, Section 3 established severe differences between European countries. Second, 
as Table 4 shows, the relative distribution of available assessments does not represent 
European countries in terms of population size. In addition, we want to explore differences 
between scientists and practitioners. This is especially of interest as the experts participating 
in the focus group discussions were practitioners (although some with scientific background). 
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4.6. Family questionnaire: data collection, content, sample and analysis 
The family questionnaire was constructed by the first author in close cooperation with 
partners from the International Federation for Family Development (IFFD) and the European 
Large Families Confederation (ELFAC). The IFFD is a federation of non-profit and non-
governmental organisations that has General Consultative Status with the UN Economic and 
Social Council. Its main activity, however, is parental training. IFFD programs are offered in 
66 countries all around the world (for more information see iffd.org). ELFAC aims at 
promoting the unity of large family organisations in Europe. Currently, it has members in 20 
different European countries. Its main objective is to represent the social and economic 
interests of families with children (see elfac.org). 
 
The final English version of the family questionnaire (fifth draft) was translated into five 
other European languages (French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish) and implemented 
online. Data collection started in late March 2016 and ended in early June 2016. Invitations to 
participate in this online survey were mainly distributed by IFFD and ELFAC (see the English 
version of the invitation in Appendix V).21 As with the expert questionnaire, the content of the 
family questionnaire was largely determined by the results of the focus group interviews. 
Most importantly, this questionnaire also included questions on the relative importance of 
each of the five identified main forces driving future vulnerability of families with children 
and the relevance of selected policy components. These questions, though not exactly phrased 
in the same way as in the expert questionnaire, allow some rough comparisons between 
opinions of experts and opinions of families (for details see Appendix V).22 
 
In total, 1,370 people submitted their answers to the family questionnaire. Respondents who 
were not yet parents (pregnancies) or who did not live in Europe were excluded from the 
                                                 
21 IFFD distributed the link to the questionnaire among its networks of families in sixteen European countries 
and sent two e-mail reminders to increase participation in the survey. ELFAC forwarded personal invitations to 
participate to each ELFAC member association in its native language, to be later distributed among the families. 
The link to the questionnaire together with a short description of the study was also published on the ELFAC 
website and disseminated through social networks: Facebook, Twitter account and the monthly newsletter. 
 
22 In addition, the insights from the expert group consultations and FGIs inspired questions on the sorrows of 
parents about the future of their children etc. These results, however, will be addressed in a separate paper. 
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analyses.23 The resulting sample of parents (N=1,343) is obviously not representative for 
Europe. Two-thirds of the respondents were female. Almost nine in ten respondents had three 
or more children. About 40 per cent had at least one child below age 3. Nine out of ten were 
married or lived in a registered partnership. In addition, responding parents were highly 
educated as 74 per cent have tertiary education. More than half of the respondents worked 
fulltime (32 hours or more per week) and a third of them were from couples with both 
partners employed full-time. Although respondents lived in 22 different European countries, 
the huge majority of them comes from three countries only: Portugal (n=511), Spain (n=424) 
and Germany (n=284) together account for 91 per cent of all cases of our sample.24 Ten per 
cent of respondents were migrants not born in the country of residence. 
 
We are well aware of the non-representative character of our sample of parents. Its specific 
characteristics are probably due to the mechanism of questionnaire distribution and the choice 
to conduct an online survey. Both distributing organisations, IFFD (Madrid) and ELFAC 
(Barcelona) have their headquarters in Spain and are thus strongly represented in Southern 
Europe. In addition, civic engagement (including memberships in voluntary organisations) as 
well as participation in online surveys are usually lower among less-educated people (see 
Campbell, 2006; Reuband, 2017; Riederer, 2006).25 Future studies should address our research 
topics using representative samples for a large number of European countries. Nevertheless, 
the present analyses will provide important insights. 
 
The strategy of the analysis for the family questionnaire is similar to the one already described 
for the expert questionnaire. Because of the high regional concentration of responding 
parents, however, analyses by regions will be done differently (for tables showing differences 
by the same six regions see additional tables in Appendix VI). Furthermore, assessments of 
policy measures will be separately examined for several potentially vulnerable subgroups of 
parents (e.g. parents living without a partner who could support them). Finally, regression 
                                                 
23 Some lived in Africa or South America, for others the country of residence was unknown. 
 
24 Countries of residence include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland. 
 
25 Not all specifics of our sample are necessarily of disadvantage. This is not the case, for instance, with regard to 
respondents’ high number of children. As large families are among family types with high risks of being 
vulnerable (e.g. Avramov, 2002; Eurostat, 2015), their opinions may be of particular relevance for policymakers. 
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analyses will be employed to find out which kinds of policies are preferred by which group of 
parents. Results of the family questionnaire study are presented in Section 6. 
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5. Results of the expert questionnaire 
5.1. The future developments of the share of vulnerable families with children 
Figure 2 displays the estimates of the experts regarding the future development of the shares 
of vulnerable families with children. The results are shown separately for the three 
distinguished dimensions of vulnerability. Respondents could state whether they expected the 
share of vulnerable families to strongly decrease, moderately decrease, slightly decrease, stay 
roughly the same, slightly increase, moderately increase or strongly increase between 2015 
and 2020 and between 2020 and 2050, respectively. In general, the results must be 
characterised as rather pessimistic: while all three options to express increases were used (two 
of them frequently), not a single expert assumed that vulnerability might strongly decrease. 
Even expectations of moderate decreases were rarely reported. Altogether, it seems that 
experts see vulnerability on the rise. 
 
Figure 2: Estimating the future development of the share of vulnerable families with children 
 
Note: Neconomic vulnerability = 76, Npsychological vulnerability = 52, Nsocial vulnerability = 75. This figure differentiates between estimates 
that the share of vulnerable families will strongly decrease (↘↘↘), moderately decrease (↘↘), slightly decrease (↘), 
stay roughly the same (≈), slightly increase (↗), moderately increase (↗↗) or strongly increase (↗↗↗). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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More than two-thirds of the experts predicted economic vulnerability to increase in the next 
few years and about half of them stated that the share of families affected by economic 
vulnerability would further increase in the period from 2020 to 2050. Participants expecting 
the share of families hit by economic vulnerability to decline within the next few years were 
the minority. Only 13 per cent reported that economic vulnerability—in their opinion— 
would decrease until 2020. At least 30 per cent, however, stated that it might do so 
afterwards. 
 
Even more pessimistic are predictions regarding psychological vulnerability. Eight out of ten 
experts thought that the share of families whose members suffer from psychological 
vulnerability was to increase during the next five years. Three-quarters expected the share of 
families affected by psychological vulnerability to grow after 2020. Only two per cent of the 
experts estimated that psychological vulnerability would decline until 2020. At least twelve 
per cent predict a shrinking share of families affected by psychological vulnerability between 
2020 and 2050. 
 
Regarding social vulnerability, the results are similar to those with economic and 
psychological vulnerability but slightly more optimistic. For the period between 2015 and 
2020, for instance, 57 per cent of the experts supposed the share of vulnerable families with 
children to rise, 24 per cent thought it would not change and eight per cent expected it to 
decrease. 
 
Due to low case numbers, it is hardly meaningful to compare ratings for different countries. 
Nevertheless, we want to give some rough impression of regional differences. For these 
analyses, countries were grouped as described in Table 4. In addition, the scale indicating 
future developments of shares of vulnerable families was collapsed indicating only decreases, 
stability and increases. Table 5 shows the numbers of experts expecting a decrease, no change 
at all or an increase for the six different regions. The results demonstrate that the general 
tendencies expected do not differ between regions. For each region, a majority of participants 
estimated the shares of vulnerable families to increase. Furthermore, Table 6 differentiates 
between assessments made by practitioners and scientists, respectively. Compared to 
scientists, a larger share of those directly working with families expected increases in social 
vulnerability in the short run (until 2020) and increases in psychological vulnerability in the 
 40 
 
long run (until 2050). Differences between them are small, however (and case numbers low; n 
between 19 and 52). 
 
Table 5: Estimating the future development of the share of vulnerable families with children 
in six different European regions 
Vulnerability dimension: Economic vulnerability 
Psychological 
vulnerability 
Social  
vulnerability 
2015-2020 (numbers of experts) ↘ ≈ ↗ ↘ ≈ ↗ ↘ ≈ ↗ 
Central western Europe 2 0 5 0 1 13 1 3 11 
German-speaking part of Europe 0 6 9 0 3 11 2 4 15 
Western Europe 2 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Northern Europe 0 0 13 0 0 1 1 2 7 
Southern Europe 3 5 14 0 1 10 2 3 8 
Eastern Europe 3 3 7 1 2 7 0 5 7 
2020-2050 (numbers of experts) ↘ ≈ ↗ ↘ ≈ ↗ ↘ ≈ ↗ 
Central western Europe 2 2 3 1 3 10 1 4 10 
German-speaking part of Europe 3 2 10 1 1 12 2 4 15 
Western Europe 1 0 5 0 0 2 0 1 3 
Northern Europe 3 2 8 0 0 1 1 5 4 
Southern Europe 9 4 9 2 0 9 2 3 8 
Eastern Europe 5 5 3 2 3 5 7 2 3 
Note: This table gives numbers of experts who estimated that the share of vulnerable families will decrease (↘), 
stay roughly the same (≈) or increase (↗) between 2015 and 2020 or 2020 and 2050, respectively. 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
Table 6: Estimating the future development of the share of vulnerable families with children: 
assessments of practitioners and scientists in comparison 
Vulnerability dimension: Economic vulnerability (N) 
Psychological 
vulnerability (N) 
Social  
vulnerability (N) 
2015-2020 (in %) ↘ ≈ ↗  ↘ ≈ ↗  ↘ ≈ ↗  
Experts (total) 13 18 68 (76) 2 15 83 (52) 8 24 68 (75) 
Practitioners 17 13 71 (24) 0 15 85 (33) 7 15 78 (27) 
Scientists 12 21 67 (52) 5 16 79 (19) 8 29 63 (48) 
2020-2050 (in %) ↘ ≈ ↗  ↘ ≈ ↗  ↘ ≈ ↗  
Experts (total) 30 20 50 (76) 12 13 75 (52) 17 25 57 (75) 
Practitioners 29 25 46 (24) 6 6 89 (33) 19 26 56 (27) 
Scientists 31 17 52 (52) 21 26 53 (19) 17 25 58 (48) 
Note: This table differentiates between estimates that the share of vulnerable families will decrease (↘), stay roughly the 
same (≈) or increase (↗) between 2015 and 2020 or 2020 and 2050, respectively. 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
These first results clearly indicate that the majority of experts did not believe that the situation 
of families with children would improve in the near future. The majority of respondents 
assumed that—irrespective of the specific dimension of vulnerability considered—shares of 
families with children affected by vulnerability would be increasing in Europe. While this is 
not desirable from the perspective of European societies in general and European politics in 
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particular, expected increases should nevertheless not be overly dramatised either. Only very 
few experts expected strong future increases of vulnerability. Figure 2 showed that most 
respondents assumed the future to bring slightly increasing shares of vulnerable families with 
children.  
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5.2. What drives different dimensions of future vulnerability of families with children? 
Different kinds of questions were asked to reveal the experts’ opinions of the relevance of 
specific societal developments for the future vulnerability of families with children (called 
“forces” of future vulnerability). We focussed on economic development, changes in gender 
roles, general cultural changes, the development of (employment factors related to the) 
reconciliation of family and work, and changes in family policy. Experts indicated the 
(relative) importance of each of these forces for future vulnerability by distributing 100 points 
among them. Before, however, we asked for estimates of the developments of fifteen drivers 
explicating these five forces (three drivers per force) and for probable effects of these 
developments on future vulnerability. 
 
5.2.1. The relative importance of major forces for future vulnerability 
Figure 3 gives the average amount of points (relevance) that experts allocated to the five 
different forces. In general, experts thought that each of the five forces had some relevance for 
the future vulnerability of families with children. Nevertheless, some of the forces were 
perceived to be more relevant (at least to specific dimensions of vulnerability) than others. For 
economic vulnerability, the economic development can be clearly identified as the most 
relevant aspect. Eight out of ten experts awarded more than 20 points to this force (if each 
force were of the same relevance, each would get 20 points). On average, experts distributed 
38 points to it. Nevertheless, there were severe differences between single experts: two 
experts distributed 80 points to economic development, while one gave it no points at all.26 
The other four forces reached average scores between 9 and 22 points. The only force 
assumed to be of minor relevance for economic vulnerability seems to be cultural change: 
almost one-quarter of the experts did not award it a single point. 
 
With regard to psychological vulnerability as well as social vulnerability, the results were 
somewhat different. Economic development was again perceived to be most important on 
average but differences between the mean estimated impacts of the five forces were much 
smaller than for economic vulnerability (with a distance of 16 points between economic 
development and family policy). While economic development reached scores of 25 and 27 
                                                 
26 For this expert policies were most important (80 points), followed by gender roles (10) and work–family 
reconciliation (10). In total, eleven per cent of the experts awarded ten points or less to economic development. 
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points, family policy and reconciliation of family life and professional work received between 
19 and 21 points in each of these two dimensions (6 and 7 points between first and second). 
 
Figure 3: Relevance of different forces for future vulnerability 
 
Note: Neconomic vulnerability = 76, Npsychological vulnerability = 52, Nsocial vulnerability = 75. Experts expressed the relevance of each of the five 
major drivers of future vulnerability on scales from 0 to 100. The sum over all five forces had to equal 100. The figure shows 
average ratings and ranges (minimum–maximum in brackets). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
 
Overall, the highest relevance for future vulnerability of families with children was attributed 
to economic development. Family policy was apparently assumed to have the second biggest 
influence. Experts awarded around 20 points to family policy for all three dimensions of 
vulnerability. Thus there is a belief that policies can affect future vulnerability in Europe. In 
addition, while especially average points given to gender roles were remarkably constant 
across the different dimensions of vulnerability (16 points on each of the three dimensions), it 
seems that general cultural change and the reconciliation of work and family life were 
assumed to be more relevant for psychological and social vulnerability than for economic 
vulnerability. 
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5.2.2. Drivers of economic vulnerability 
Experts assessed the developments of fifteen drivers on 7-point rating scales ranging from 
“strongly decrease” (-3) to “strongly increase” (+3). Immediately afterwards, they indicated 
the probable effects of these developments on future shares of vulnerable families with 
children using the same 7-point rating scales. Table 7 summarises all answers referring to the 
economic dimension of vulnerability. In addition, it gives correlation coefficients (Pearson r) 
for the association between the estimated development of a driver and its estimated 
consequence for the share of families affected by economic vulnerability. A positive 
(negative) correlation coefficient indicates that an increase of the driver is—on average—
assumed to lead to an increase (a decrease) in the shares of vulnerable families in the future. 
 
Table 7: Main forces and corresponding drivers of economic vulnerability 
Forces and corresponding drivers of future vulnerability  
(share of vulnerable families in 2050) 
Development  
of driver  
(-3 to +3) 
Effect on 
economic 
vulnerability  
(-3 to +3) 
Association 
between 
them 
m (sd) m (sd) r 
Economic development      
Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita .17 (1.17) -.08 (1.08) -.06 
Unemployment .16 (1.13) .32 (1.27) .75 
Inequality in earnings .88 (1.17) .78 (1.20) .77 
Cultural change      
Acceptance of the pluralism of family forms 1.11 (.93) .05 (.83) .11 
Strength of personal relationships -.32 (.80) .25 (.82) -.16 
Demands of parenting (i.e. the effort expected of a good parent  
to make children grow up safe and happy) .97 (.98) .38 (.94) .17 
Gender roles      
Female labour force participation 1.11 (.89) -.26 (1.15) .04 
Share of men engaged in childcare 1.09 (.61) -.13 (.87) -.23 
Frequency of arrangements of shared physical custody (with alternating 
residence) of a child after divorce 1.29 (.78) -.04 (1.26) -.10 
Employment factors affecting the reconciliation of family and work      
Job demands (in terms of longer working hours and more work 
commitment) .67 (1.09) .21 (1.07) .37 
Frequency of flexible working arrangements (such as telecommuting, 
working from home, flexi-time etc.) 1.26 (.68) -.18 (.98) .23 
Work-related geographical mobility of parents 1.00 (.65) .16 (.94) .28 
Family policies      
Financial support to families (provided by national or regional 
governments) -.24 (1.03) .28 (1.26) -.63 
Access to childcare provided by the government .45 (1.01) -.16 (1.28) -.47 
Government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise their 
workload when they want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce  
worktime or temporarily quit their job) 
.50 (.68) -.12 (.86) -.31 
Note: N = 76. Experts assessed whether the driver and thus the share of vulnerable families will strongly decrease (-3), 
moderately decrease (-2), slightly decrease (-1), stay roughly the same (0), slightly increase (+1), moderately increase (+2) or 
strongly increase (+3). Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Two out of the three drivers subsumed under economic development show strong associations 
with economic vulnerability: rises in unemployment and in inequality of earnings were 
assumed to raise the share of vulnerable families (r=.75 and .77). Looking at the mean ratings, 
experts on average assumed only a very small increase in unemployment (m=.16) but a 
clearer one in inequality of earnings (m=.88) leading to corresponding increases in future 
shares of vulnerable families (m=.32 and .78, respectively). Surprisingly, the estimated 
development of real gross domestic product per capita was not linked to expected changes in 
economic vulnerability. The slight increase in real gross domestic product per capita assumed 
by experts (m=.17) was not expected to lead to a decrease in economic vulnerability (m=-.08; 
r=-.06). 
 
Another driver that showed a strong association with economic vulnerability belongs to family 
policy: higher financial transfers were assumed to decrease the share of vulnerable families 
with children (r=-.63). On average, however, experts expected financial support to families by 
governments to decrease (m=-.24) so that economic vulnerability would slightly increase in 
the future (m=.28). Medium associations between assessments of future developments of 
drivers and estimated consequences on future economic vulnerability of families with children 
were found for access to public childcare (more childcare, lower vulnerability) and job 
demands (increasing job demands, higher vulnerability).27 Noteworthy might also be 
associations with the other drivers belonging to family policy or employment factors affecting 
the reconciliation of family and work: public support to reorganise workload (more support, 
lower vulnerability), work-related geographical mobility (higher mobility, higher 
vulnerability) and flexible working arrangements (higher flexibility, lower vulnerability). 
 
Overall, drivers related to the future economic development—except real GDP per capita— 
were perceived to be most important for future economic vulnerability of families with 
children, followed by public policy and the reconciliation of family and work. This finding 
corresponds to results obtained with relative relevance scores. According to the correlational 
results, however, cultural changes in general seem to be less relevant than the reconciliation 
of family and work. Again in line with previous results, changes in gender roles were not 
assumed to affect future economic vulnerability. 
                                                 
27 Job demands were explained to comprise working hours and commitment to the job. 
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5.2.3. Drivers of psychological vulnerability 
Table 8 summarises all answers referring to the psychological dimension of vulnerability and 
gives correlation coefficients for the association between the assessment of the development 
of a driver and its estimated consequence for the share of families affected by vulnerability. 
Strong associations between estimated developments of drivers and their consequences on 
future psychological vulnerability of families with children were again found with 
unemployment (higher unemployment, higher psychological vulnerability) and earnings 
inequality (higher inequality, higher psychological vulnerability). In addition, future job 
demands and the development of the strength of personal relationships were also assumed to 
be strongly linked to future psychological vulnerability. On average, experts expected that 
increasing job demands and a weakening of personal relationships would amplify future 
psychological vulnerability. 
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Table 8: Main forces and corresponding drivers of psychological vulnerability 
Forces and corresponding drivers of future vulnerability  
(share of vulnerable families in 2050) 
Development  
of driver  
(-3 to +3) 
Effect on 
psychological 
vulnerability  
(-3 to +3) 
Association 
between 
them 
m (sd) m (sd) r 
Economic development      
Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita .02 (1.16) .46 (1.31) .06 
Unemployment .27 (1.12) .69 (1.20) .81 
Inequality in earnings .81 (1.17) .69 (1.06) .77 
Cultural change      
Acceptance of the pluralism of family forms 1.19 (.91) .10 (1.43) .02 
Strength of personal relationships -.27 (1.01) .44 (1.11) -.66 
Demands of parenting (i.e. the effort expected of a good parent  
to make children grow up safe and happy) 1.13 (1.01) .71 (1.45) .16 
Gender roles      
Female labour force participation .90 (.87) .46 (.94) .54 
Share of men engaged in childcare 1.02 (.75) -.35 (.95) -.40 
Frequency of arrangements of shared physical custody (with alternating 
residence) of a child after divorce 1.23 (.94) .52 (1.36) .23 
Employment factors affecting the reconciliation of family and work      
Job demands (in terms of longer working hours and more work 
commitment) .73 (1.05) .81 (1.09) .75 
Frequency of flexible working arrangements (such as telecommuting, 
working from home, flexi-time etc.) 1.31 (.70) -.42 (1.00) -.06 
Work-related geographical mobility of parents 1.04 (.74) .75 (1.03) .45 
Family policies      
Financial support to families (provided by national or regional 
governments) -.46 (1.11) .48 (1.28) -.52 
Access to childcare provided by the government .21 (1.02) .00 (1.17) -.46 
Government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise their 
workload when they want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce  
worktime or temporarily quit their job) 
.23 (1.02) -.27 (1.05) -.23 
Note: N = 52. Experts assessed whether the driver and thus the share of vulnerable families will strongly decrease (-3), 
moderately decrease (-2), slightly decrease (-1), stay roughly the same (0), slightly increase (+1), moderately increase (+2) or 
strongly increase (+3). Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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The following drivers showed medium associations between assessments of their future 
developments and the estimated consequences on future psychological vulnerability of 
families with children: female labour force participation, the share of men engaged in 
childcare, work-related geographical mobility and financial support by governments. While 
an increase in female labour force participation was assumed to lead to an increase in the 
shares of vulnerable families, an increase in male engagement in childcare was assumed to 
counterbalance this negative effect. Furthermore, greater geographical mobility and lower 
financial support by governments would contribute to an increasing share of families affected 
by psychological vulnerability. 
 
Small but noteworthy correlation coefficients result from assessments concerning 
arrangements of shared physical custody and government support for parents to reorganise 
their workload. A future increase in government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise 
their workload when they want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce worktime or temporarily 
quit their job) was assumed to bring a reduction in the share of families affected by 
psychological vulnerability in Europe. A rise in the frequency of arrangements of shared 
physical custody (with alternating residence) of a child after divorce, however, was expected 
to increase psychological vulnerability of families with children. 
 
None of the five forces was assumed to be irrelevant with regard to future psychological 
vulnerability of families with children. In contrast to results for economic vulnerability, at 
least certain drivers related to changes in gender roles or other cultural aspects were given 
some importance. Nevertheless, drivers referring to the economic development 
(unemployment, earnings inequality) were again perceived to be most important for future 
vulnerability. 
 
5.2.4. Drivers of social vulnerability 
Table 9 summarises answers referring to social vulnerability and gives correlation coefficients 
for the association between the assessment of the development of a driver and its estimated 
consequence for the share of vulnerable families. Strong associations with social vulnerability 
were found for unemployment, inequality in earnings, financial support for families by the 
government, access to public childcare and public support to reorganise workload when 
parents want to dedicate more time to their children. Once more, drivers representing the 
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economic development and family policy seemed to be most important. While increases in 
unemployment and earnings inequality as well as decreases in financial transfers to families 
were assumed to contribute to increasing social vulnerability, improved access to public 
childcare and more government support to parents who want to reorganise their workload 
were expected to decrease the future share of vulnerable families with children. 
 
Table 9: Main forces and corresponding drivers of social vulnerability 
Forces and corresponding drivers of future vulnerability  
(share of vulnerable families in 2050) 
Development  
of driver  
(-3 to +3) 
Effect  
on social 
vulnerability  
(-3 to +3) 
Association 
between 
them 
m (sd) m (sd) r 
Economic development      
Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita .21 (1.14) .13 (1.12) -.40 
Unemployment .36 (1.12) .59 (1.16) .67 
Inequality in earnings 1.07 (1.19) .89 (1.10) .77 
Cultural change      
Acceptance of the pluralism of family forms 1.31 (.96) -.08 (1.26) -.17 
Strength of personal relationships -.40 (.90) .31 (.87) -.15 
Demands of parenting (i.e. the effort expected of a good parent  
to make children grow up safe and happy) 1.09 (1.05) .71 (1.00) .26 
Gender roles      
Female labour force participation 1.01 (.98) .03 (1.09) .01 
Share of men engaged in childcare 1.03 (.73) -.41 (.93) -.08 
Frequency of arrangements of shared physical custody (with alternating 
residence) of a child after divorce 1.19 (.80) .05 (1.10) -.06 
Employment factors affecting the reconciliation of family and work      
Job demands (in terms of longer working hours and more work 
commitment) 1.04 (1.08) .75 (1.15) .48 
Frequency of flexible working arrangements (such as telecommuting, 
working from home, flexi-time etc.) 1.32 (.90) -.03 (1.11) -.11 
Work-related geographical mobility of parents 1.01 (.86) .49 (.94) .33 
Family policies      
Financial support to families (provided by national or regional 
governments) -.64 (1.28) .37 (1.36) -.60 
Access to childcare provided by the government .28 (1.16) -.13 (1.21) -.65 
Government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise their 
workload when they want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce  
worktime or temporarily quit their job) 
.41 (1.14) -.08 (1.10) -.65 
Note: N = 75. Experts assessed whether the driver and thus the share of vulnerable families will strongly decrease (-3), 
moderately decrease (-2), slightly decrease (-1), stay roughly the same (0), slightly increase (+1), moderately increase (+2) or 
strongly increase (+3). Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
 
Medium associations between assessments of their future developments and the estimated 
consequences on future social vulnerability were found for job demands (higher demands, 
higher social vulnerability) and, interestingly, real GDP per capita (the higher the GDP, the 
lower increases in social vulnerability). The weak association of the estimated development of 
GDP per capita with expected future economic vulnerability was surprising. It seems, 
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however, that experts think that development of GDP is more relevant for social vulnerability. 
Finally, small but noteworthy associations were found with work-related geographical 
mobility (higher mobility, higher social vulnerability) and demands of parenting (higher 
demands, higher social vulnerability). 
 
To sum up, drivers referring to economic development or family policy were assumed by 
experts to be most important for social vulnerability. The drivers concerning changes in 
gender roles were given least relevance. These observations largely fit into the picture drawn 
by our previous results. Experts usually highlight economic development, family policy and 
(sometimes) reconciliation issues. The consequences of changes in gender roles and other 
cultural aspects for vulnerability of families with children were not emphasised to the same 
extent—at least until psychological aspects of vulnerability are discussed. 
 
5.3. Policies to stop the reproduction of future vulnerability of families with children 
Preventing children from inheriting vulnerability from their families of origin is a major 
future challenge for European policymakers. The last section describing the results of the 
expert questionnaire therefore addresses policy measures to stop the intergenerational 
transmission of vulnerability. In the focus groups, several forms of policy measures were 
mentioned but discussants obviously placed most emphasis on educational policies. For us, it 
is therefore of special interest to see how a larger group of experts evaluated the discussed 
policies and whether the result that educational measures are most important can be replicated 
in the questionnaire study or not. Though our sample of experts is not representative, this 
would at least allow a rough quantification of our qualitative results. 
 
Experts assessed the relevance of ten selected policy measures. Figure 4 presents the results 
for Europe in some detail. Table 10 gives mean ratings and standard deviations differentiated 
by regions and type of expert (practitioners/ scientists). In general, all ten measures were 
expected to be important. Even the measure rated worst on average, i.e. supporting stay-at-
home mothers, was at least not irrelevant for more than two-thirds of the experts. 
Nevertheless, there were marked differences in the degree of perceived relevance as the 
shares of experts who thought that a specific measure was indispensable varied from 7 to 37 
per cent (lower prices of food and other products of day-to-day importance/ providing 
flexible, affordable childcare options for preschool children aged 0–5). 
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Figure 4: Relevance of policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
 
Note: N=175. For detailed wording in the questionnaire (policy measures) see Table 11 or Appendix II. 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
 
The three policy measures rated highest on average were (1) providing flexible, affordable 
childcare options for preschool children, (2) organising assistance for children with special 
needs and (3) making employers aware that it makes sense to care for the work–life balance 
of their employees (for means see Table 11). More than two-thirds of the experts thought that 
assistance for children with special needs and raising employers’ awareness are indispensable 
or at least very important in preventing children from the intergenerational transmission of 
vulnerability. Nevertheless, the relevance given to childcare for preschool children was 
outstanding. Almost three-quarters of the experts thought that childcare options are either 
indispensable or very important. An additional 12 and 9 per cent stated that childcare options 
are moderately important or important to stop the reproduction of vulnerability. Less than two 
per cent rated this factor to be irrelevant or counter-productive. 
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A high importance rating could be also observed for providing education for all children 
already at an early age. More than half of the responding experts believed that the provision 
of early education is indispensable or at least very important to stop the reproduction of 
vulnerability. At least of moderate importance were the following measures: (a) investing in 
preventative actions with regard to problems with alcohol, drugs or violence; (b) providing 
information, counselling and coaching for families; (c) organising education and mentoring 
for children after school and during holidays; (d) direct financial transfers to families in 
need.28 
 
Two measures were clearly perceived to be of less importance in preventing children from 
inheriting vulnerability from their families of origin in Europe: lower prices of food and other 
products of day-to-day importance and supporting mothers who want to leave the labour 
market to take care of their children. A look at Figure 4 shows somewhat polarised opinions 
with regard to both measures but especially regarding the support for stay-at-home mothers. 
One in six experts thought that supporting mothers wanting to leave the labour market is 
indispensable to stop the reproduction of vulnerability but almost as many considered this to 
be counter-productive. Indeed, this policy measure is characterised by ambivalence: staying at 
home means that mothers can spend more time with their children but might also increase 
financial insecurity of families and undermine the career prospects of mothers—who are also 
often role models for their children. 
 
Table 10 gives results differentiated by region. In three of the six regions, provision of 
childcare was rated highest—in the German-speaking countries, northern Europe and western 
Europe. In western Europe, childcare shares the position on top with assistance for children 
with special needs which lead the relevance rating in southern Europe as well. Raising 
awareness of employers was perceived to be most relevant in central western Europe and 
eastern Europe. The lowest relevance ratings within regions were obtained by support of stay-
at-home mothers in the German-speaking countries, northern Europe and eastern Europe. In 
central western Europe, western Europe and southern Europe, least relevance was given to 
lower prices of daily products. The highest average relevance rating was found for provision 
                                                 
28 For Europe in total, the average ratings of these measures were still higher than five on the 7-point-scale where 
5 stands for “moderately important”, 6 for “very important” and 7 for “indispensable” (see Table 10). 
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of childcare in the German-speaking countries (m=6.17) and the lowest for support of stay-at-
home mothers in northern Europe (m=2.52). 
 54 
 
Table 10: Policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
Policy measures to stop the 
reproduction of vulnerability  
within families 
Central western 
Europe 
German-speaking 
part of Europe 
Western  
Europe 
Northern  
Europe 
Southern  
Europe 
Eastern  
Europe 
Europe  
(total) Practitioners Scientists 
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) 
1. direct financial transfers to 
families in need 4.63 (1.69) 4.78 (1.47) 5.27 (1.56) 5.10 (1.09) 5.40 (1.45) 5.18 (1.44) 5.03 (1.48) 4.86 (1.44) 5.14 (1.49) 
2. lower prices of food and other 
products of day-to-day 
importance 
3.97 (1.45) 4.13 (1.44) 4.27 (1.27) 4.00 (1.30) 4.88 (1.52) 4.75 (1.58) 4.38 (1.48) 4.32 (1.45) 4.39 (1.52) 
3. providing information, 
counselling and coaching for 
families (parents and kids) 
4.77 (1.55) 5.50 (1.38) 4.82 (1.25) 4.52 (1.17) 5.10 (1.46) 5.32 (1.12) 5.10 (1.39) 5.39 (1.36) 4.91 (1.37) 
4. providing flexible, affordable 
childcare options for 
preschool children (age 0–5) 
5.47 (1.50) 6.17 (1.20) 5.73 (1.27) 6.05 (1.07) 5.85 (1.14) 5.75 (1.32) 5.87 (1.26) 5.65 (1.35) 6.01 (1.19) 
5. supporting mothers who want 
to leave the labour market to 
take care of their children 
4.50 (2.03) 3.93 (2.18) 5.36 (2.25) 2.52 (1.69) 5.13 (1.76) 4.57 (1.50) 4.34 (2.04) 4.97 (1.95) 3.91 (2.02) 
6. organising assistance for 
children with special needs 
(e.g. migrant students with 
language deficits, disabled 
children) 
5.53 (1.04) 6.04 (1.01) 5.73 (1.19) 5.48 (1.12) 5.98 (1.05) 5.32 (1.09) 5.74 (1.09) 5.72 (1.07) 5.75 (1.10) 
7. investing in preventative 
actions with regard to 
problems with alcohol, drugs 
or violence 
5.07 (1.08) 5.15 (1.41) 4.73 (1.56) 5.05 (1.24) 5.08 (1.25) 5.46 (1.48) 5.14 (1.31) 5.14 (1.22) 5.12 (1.39) 
8. providing education for all 
children already at an early 
age (age 3–5) 
5.43 (1.59) 5.48 (1.55) 5.55 (1.04) 5.10 (1.61) 5.38 (1.46) 5.21 (1.73) 5.36 (1.54) 5.19 (1.54) 5.48 (1.53) 
9. organising education and 
mentoring for children after 
school and during holidays 
5.07 (1.08) 5.30 (1.40) 4.64 (1.50) 5.14 (1.24) 4.98 (1.56) 4.82 (1.44) 5.05 (1.38) 4.80 (1.38) 5.21 (1.36) 
10. making employers aware 
that it makes sense to care 
for the work–life balance of 
their employees 
5.63 (1.43) 5.91 (1.28) 4.82 (2.27) 5.38 (1.20) 5.58 (1.58) 5.64 (1.13) 5.63 (1.42) 5.67 (1.31) 5.60 (1.49) 
N 30  46  11  21  40  28  175  69  106  
Note: The original scale ranges from 1 “counter-productive” to 7 “indispensable”. Shown are means (m) and standard deviations (sd). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Differences between regions do exist but are often small. The differences between the 
maximum and the minimum of means across regions is below half a point on the 7-point 
rating scale, with providing early education and organisation of education and mentoring for 
children after school and during holidays (e.g., m=5.55 in western Europe and m=5.10 in 
northern Europe for early education). It is around .7 or .8 with (a) childcare, (b) assistance for 
children with special needs, (c) investing in preventative actions, (d) financial transfers and 
(e) lower prices for products of day-to-day importance. Investing in preventative actions with 
regard to problems with alcohol, drugs or violence was given most emphasis in eastern 
Europe (m=5.46) and least emphasis in western Europe (m=4.73). Financial transfers and 
lower prices for products were both rated highest in southern Europe and lowest in central 
western Europe. The relevance ratings of childcare and of assistance for children with special 
needs were highest in the German-speaking countries. 
 
A remarkable difference could be found with regard to raising employers’ awareness. Its 
relevance was rated highest in the German-speaking countries (m=5.91) and lowest in western 
Europe (m=4.82). The difference between the maximum and the minimum of average 
regional ratings for providing information, counselling and coaching for families was of 
similar size than the one for raising employers’ awareness. It was rated lowest by experts for 
northern Europe (m=4.52). The highest rating came, once more, from experts for the German-
speaking countries (m=5.50).29 By far the largest difference between the maximum and the 
minimum of average regional ratings could be found with support for stay-at-home mothers. 
While experts for northern European countries did not think that this support is of great help 
to break the cycle of reproduction of vulnerability in families (m=2.52), experts for the 
German-speaking (m=3.93), central western (m=4.50), eastern (m=4.57), southern (m=5.13) 
or western European countries (m=5.36), put much more emphasis on such a policy. 
 
Furthermore, Table 10 reveals interesting differences between practitioners and scientists. 
Pronounced differences could be found with regard to support for stay-at-home mothers 
(m=4.97 vs. 3.91) and the relevance of counselling and coaching for families (m=5.39 vs. 
4.91). Both measures were more important for practitioners than for scientists. Scientists, on 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that the highest average regional ratings were found with experts for German-speaking 
countries for five out of ten statements. The lowest average relevance ratings referred three times to northern 
Europe and three times to central western Europe. 
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the other hand placed slightly more emphasis than practitioners on education after school and 
in holidays, childcare for preschool children, education at an early age and financial transfers. 
Maybe practitioners directly working with vulnerable families and in part responsible for 
counselling and coaching indeed perceive and thus highlight other aspects of vulnerability 
than scientists who are more involved in analysing abstract data and aggregated outcomes. 
While childcare was most important, and support of stay-at-home mothers least important for 
scientists, practitioners considered assistance for children with special needs to be most 
important and lower prices of products needed for daily life to be least important. 
 
In focus groups, education was understood to be the main instrument against the reproduction 
of vulnerability. Education was broadly defined and comprised education for children, parents 
and other important societal actors, in particular employers. What can results of the expert 
questionnaire add to the results of focus groups? First, the evidence regarding education for 
children came out somewhat mixed. The two policy measures directly referring to education 
of children were not among the three measures identified as the most important ones. 
However, while education after school and during holidays was of medium importance only, 
the average relevance rating of early childhood education was very high. In addition, the two 
policy measures with highest relevance scores—childcare options and assistance for children 
with special needs—include educational elements. Second, the only policy measure listed 
which referred to parents (providing information, counselling and coaching) was considered 
to be of medium relevance as well. Third, “education” of employers was perceived as very 
relevant to stop the intergenerational transmission of vulnerability as raising awareness of 
employers was among the top three policy measures. To sum up, the present results do not 
contradict the result of focus groups. Rather, they add important information. The results of 
the questionnaire study allow differentiating between relevant and highly relevant policy 
measures from the area of education. 
 
Another interesting finding is that results did not emphasise the relevance of financial 
measures. While experts on average perceived transfers for families to be of medium 
importance, lowering the prices of daily used products would be placed in ninth position 
within a relevance ranking among the ten listed measures.30 This is generally in line with 
                                                 
30 Table 10 shows that the mean rating is 4.38 (all assessments). This is the second lowest mean rating among the 
ten policy measures. 
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results of the focus group research. Several discussants in focus groups already had serious 
doubts that financial measures were the right policies to overcome the effects of heritage on 
future vulnerability. Among other things, it was mentioned that financial transfers might even 
have counter-acting effects when children get used to living on welfare payments. The 
conclusion in focus groups was that monetary benefits were necessary for those with most 
urgent needs but had to be embedded in a broader political strategy to successfully fight the 
reproduction of vulnerability within families. 
 
The findings of the present research also indicate certain differences between groups of 
experts that might be due to diverse perspectives resulting from diverging experience with 
vulnerable families. Finally, the results of the expert questionnaire provide some hints on 
regional differences within Europe that by and large correspond to the welfare state regimes 
dominating in the respective parts of Europe. For conclusions to be drawn, however, future 
studies including a higher number of experts—and experts that are in some way representative 
for their regions and different professions—are needed. The only implication the present 
research allows in this respect is stressing the need of knowing different perspectives, 
probably all of them being important. 
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6. Results of the family questionnaire 
6.1. The relative importance of major forces for future vulnerability 
In the family questionnaire, participants were asked for their opinion on how important future 
developments (changes) in five areas will be for the well-being of families. The five areas 
reflected the five major forces identified by experts in focus group discussions: (1) changes in 
economic development, (2) changes in gender roles (relations between the sexes; division of 
housework, childcare and professional work between women and men), (3) changes in culture 
(lifestyles, values etc.), (4) changes in the reconciliation of family life and professional work, 
(5) changes in welfare and family policy. Figure 5 gives the results showing average 
relevance ratings for these five forces. 
 
Figure 5: Major forces affecting vulnerability of families with children 
 
Note: N between 1,124 and 1,170. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
The parents interviewed perceived all of these five factors to be relevant, as all average 
ratings are clearly above the middle of the available scale reaching from 1 (not important) to 7 
(very important). In line with results obtained in the expert questionnaire study, respondents 
rated changes in gender roles and other cultural changes the lowest. Though not ranked 
highest, economic development was regarded as highly relevant for future well-being of 
families with children. Most important for parents, however, were welfare and family policies 
and the reconciliation of family life and professional work (reaching a mean rating of 6). 
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Figure 6: Major forces affecting vulnerability by country of residence 
 
Note: N between 1,124 and 1,170. The original scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for 
families”. Shown are means (m). Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
 
Table A.5 in the Appendix gives mean ratings of parents by the six regional groups used for 
analysis of the expert questionnaire.31 With the family questionnaire, however, a different 
grouping seems to be more meaningful as most respondents live in one of three countries. 
Figure 6 thus gives the results by country of residence for parents from Germany, Portugal, 
Spain and other European countries. The basic pattern of results seems to be the same: In all 
four groups, gender roles are perceived to be less relevant than other forces while welfare and 
family policies are highly rated. Policies obtained the highest mean rating by parents from 
Germany. In Portugal and Spain, changes in reconciliation of family life and professional 
work were perceived to be most important for future well-being of families with children. 
Surprisingly, parents of other countries emphasised cultural change. This may be a hint that 
though there are a lot of commonalities, regional differences might still matter. In addition, it 
should be noted that in general mean relevance ratings of parents from other European 
                                                 
31 Comparing the relevance of one force across regions, it becomes obvious that both economic development and 
work–family reconciliation are perceived to be of exceptional relevance in southern Europe. Cultural change is 
rated higher in central western Europe and changes in gender roles as well as family policies are rated higher in 
western Europe than in any other region. Comparing the relevance of forces within regions, economic 
development was ranked surprisingly low by parents from western and central western Europe (see Table A.5). 
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countries were lower than the ones of parents from Portugal and Spain (with the exception of 
cultural change). 
 
6.2. Policies: overview 
Parents were also asked how important specific policy measures will be if governments want 
to reduce vulnerability in the next generations. Beforehand, it was explained that the next 
question will be about children who grow up in families where members suffer from 
vulnerability, i.e. from social risks and problems such as poverty, stress and depression and/or 
a lack of support by other people. It was also made clear that vulnerability is often passed on 
from parents to their children and that individuals who grew up in vulnerability are at risk of 
starting families of their own that are affected by vulnerability as well. The ten policy 
measures mentioned were exactly the same as in the expert questionnaire. 
 
Figure 7: Relevance of policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
 
Note: N=1,343. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Figure 7 displays the detailed answers given by responding parents. They perceived raising 
awareness of employers for work–family balance and supporting stay-at-home mothers to be 
of prior importance, followed by assistance for children with special needs. With regard to 
one of these policies, there is a huge discrepancy between the parents’ opinion and the 
assessments by experts. For experts, support of stay-at-home mothers was (on average) the 
least important of these ten policy measures. It was (almost) the only measure where a certain 
polarisation could be observed as a considerable fraction of experts found this measure to be 
even counter-productive. This is, however, mainly due to experts from northern Europe. For 
them support of stay-at-home mothers seems to be much less relevant than for experts from 
other parts of Europe or parents—including parents from northern Europe (see Table 10 and 
compare with Table A.6 in the Appendix).32 
 
Parents, on the other hand, were least convinced of educational measures (education after 
school and in holidays, early schooling). Interestingly, those were exactly the policies whose 
relevance for inhibiting the reproduction of vulnerability was emphasised most by experts in 
our focus group discussions. Views of scientists and practitioners seem to differ from 
opinions of parents. It has to be noted, however, that only the relative ranking of educational 
measures among all the other policy measures was lower with parents than with experts. 
Disregarding the other policies, the absolute ratings of parents and experts were very similar 
(compare percentage points shown in Figures 4 and 7): both think that education is of great 
importance. 
 
In the following, average relevance ratings are shown instead of detailed results. Figure 8 
displays results for Germany, Portugal, Spain and other European countries. Figure 8 reveals 
that especially parents from Germany did not believe in avoiding the reproduction of 
vulnerability by early education for all children (mean rating below 4 on the relevance scale 
from 1 to 7). Raising awareness of employers obtained the highest average relevance rating in 
Germany, Portugal and Spain. In other European countries it was support for stay-at-home 
mothers, followed by raising awareness of employers. (These two items obtained mean 
ratings between 5.9 and 6.5.) 
 
                                                 
32 Table A.7 in the Appendix gives mean ratings of parents by the six regional groups used for analysis of the 
expert questionnaire. 
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Figure 8: Relevance of policy measures by country of residence 
 
Note: N=1,343. The original scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very 
important”. Shown are means (m). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
 
 
6.3. Policies: in-depth analyses 
6.3.1. Ratings by potentially vulnerable subgroups 
What do members of vulnerable families themselves think? The family questionnaire does not 
allow an identification of vulnerable families. Nevertheless, it is possible to get some hints by 
analysing specific subgroups of parents reporting financial difficulties (problems to make 
ends meet), parents living without a partner who could support them, parents stating that their 
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family does not do many things together or that they do not talk a lot with their own 
child(ren), parents reporting severe interferences of their family life with other areas of life 
(professional work, friends, sports, cultural activities etc.) and parents complaining about not 
having enough time for their child(ren). Table 11 gives the mean relevance ratings of policy 
measures for exactly these subgroups of responding parents. 
 
According to Table 11, for instance, parents with financial difficulties awarded much more 
relevance to lower prices of food and other products of day-to-day importance than parents 
did on average. In addition, they attached more value than others to direct financial transfers 
of the government. Nevertheless, making employers aware that it makes sense to care for the 
work–life balance of their employees is most relevant also for this subgroup of parents—as it 
is for all of the subgroups analysed. 
 
Similar to parents with financial difficulties, those who live without a partner in the same 
household also gave more importance to direct financial transfers than the average parent. 
Though still perceived as very important (among the top three measures), support of stay-at-
home mothers was rated below average by this subgroup of parents. By contrast, organising 
education and mentoring for children after school and during holidays was rated higher by 
parents not living together with a partner than by other parents. 
 
Interestingly, parents stating that they do not talk a lot with their own child(ren) attached less 
relevance to the provision of information, counselling and coaching for families than the 
average parent. With regard to other measures, average assessments of this subgroup of 
parents are mostly close to those of all parents. More or less the same holds for parents 
reporting that their family does not do many things together. 
 
Similar to parents with financial difficulties, parents reporting severe interferences of their 
family life with other areas of life and parents complaining about not having enough time for 
their child(ren) attached great importance to raising awareness of employers for work–family 
balance. In addition, these two subgroups of parents rated the provision of childcare options, 
preventative actions, early education and education and mentoring for children after school 
and during holidays higher than the average parent—thereby indicating that these measures 
might all help to improve the reconciliation of family life and professional work. 
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Table 11: Relevance of policy measures for potentially vulnerable subgroups 
Policy measures to stop the 
reproduction of vulnerability  
within families 
Economic/  
financial 
difficulties 
No partner or  
not in same 
household 
Family does not 
do many things 
together 
Do not talk  
a lot with  
each other 
Interference of 
family life with 
other areas 
Not enough  
time for  
child(ren) 
Total  
sample 
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) 
1. direct financial transfers to 
families in need 5.89 (1.50) 5.80 (1.48) 5.42 (1.80) 5.27 (1.71) 5.63 (1.82) 5.39 (1.90) 5.38 (1.72) 
2. lower prices of food and other 
products of day-to-day 
importance 
6.03 (1.40) 5.68 (1.59) 5.63 (1.64) 5.51 (1.61) 5.91 (1.48) 5.92 (1.52) 5.58 (1.63) 
3. providing information, counselling 
and coaching for families 
(parents and kids) 
5.79 (1.50) 5.86 (1.47) 5.47 (1.58) 5.39 (1.55) 5.82 (1.56) 5.64 (1.58) 5.63 (1.51) 
4. providing flexible, affordable 
childcare options for preschool 
children (age 0–5) 
5.93 (1.59) 5.87 (1.43) 5.75 (1.49) 5.60 (1.64) 5.98 (1.56) 6.03 (1.50) 5.69 (1.57) 
5. supporting mothers who want to 
leave the labour market to take 
care of their children 
6.38 (1.25) 6.01 (1.42) 6.17 (1.42) 6.03 (1.53) 6.26 (1.47) 6.12 (1.64) 6.18 (1.36) 
6. organising assistance for children 
with special needs (e.g. migrant 
students with language deficits, 
disabled children) 
6.28 (1.20) 5.82 (1.51) 6.04 (1.32) 5.89 (1.32) 6.29 (1.31) 6.09 (1.41) 6.06 (1.31) 
7. investing in preventative actions 
with regard to problems with 
alcohol, drugs or violence 
6.02 (1.34) 6.03 (1.37) 5.76 (1.48) 5.71 (1.42) 6.00 (1.43) 5.97 (1.38) 5.82 (1.40) 
8. providing education for all 
children already at an early age 
(age 3–5) 
5.46 (1.94) 5.35 (1.89) 5.34 (1.84) 5.30 (1.94) 5.59 (1.92) 5.62 (1.82) 5.26 (1.88) 
9. organising education and 
mentoring for children after 
school and during holidays 
5.31 (1.77) 5.54 (1.67) 5.11 (1.73) 4.98 (1.76) 5.28 (1.89) 5.34 (1.85) 5.04 (1.75) 
10. making employers aware that it 
makes sense to care for the 
work–life balance of their 
employees 
6.54 (.97) 6.38 (1.18) 6.37 (1.04) 6.18 (1.27) 6.52 (1.13) 6.49 (1.16) 6.30 (1.16) 
N 378  71  161  122  234  181  1,343  
Note: The original scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for families”. Shown are means (m) and standard deviations (sd). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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6.3.2. What affects the relevance ratings of different policy dimensions? 
The final subsection presenting results obtained with family questionnaire data should give 
some hints which groups of parents prefer what kinds of policies. To answer this question, 
tools of factor analysis (principal component analysis, varimax rotation) were employed. It 
turned out that three items clearly belong to one policy dimension: (a) direct financial 
transfers to families in need, (b) lower prices of food and other products of day-to-day 
importance and (c) supporting mothers who want to leave the labour market to take care of 
their children.33 Four items obviously belong to a different dimension: (i) providing flexible, 
affordable childcare options for preschool children, (ii) investing in preventative actions with 
regard to problems with alcohol, drugs or violence, (iv) providing education for all children 
already at an early age and (iii) organising education and mentoring for children after school 
and during holidays.34 The three remaining policy items (information, counselling and 
coaching for families; assistance for children with special needs; raising awareness of 
employers) were more closely related to the second dimension but their assignment to one of 
them was not that clear.35 Items (a) to (c) were used to construct a mean index measuring the 
financial benefits dimension and items (i) to (iv) to capture the educational policy dimension. 
Finally, regression analyses were employed to analyse who gives more relevance to these 
dimensions. The results of these regression analyses are discussed in the following (for details 
see Table A.7 in Appendix VI). 
 
Regression analyses confirm that both financial benefits and educational policies were more 
often perceived to be relevant in hindering the reproduction of vulnerability by parents from 
Portugal and Spain than by parents living in Germany. In addition, mothers perceive both 
policy dimensions to be important more than fathers. Interestingly, the highly educated find 
both policy dimensions to be less relevant than parents without tertiary education. One’s own 
age, age of the youngest child, number of children and household composition seem to be less 
important for relevance ratings of policy dimensions. The financial situation of the household 
influences relevance ratings of both dimensions. The more easily ends were met by household 
                                                 
33 Factor loadings varied between .68 and 75 on the one factor and between .07 and .28 on the other factor. 
 
34 Factor loadings were between .64 and .83 on this factor and between .00 and .34 on the other one. 
 
35 Factor loadings varied between .54 and .59 on one and between .32 and .38 on the other factor. 
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income, the less relevant policy measures were perceived. This association, however, is 
stronger with regard to financial benefits than with regard to educational policies.   
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Additional regression analyses also include attitudes regarding the role of the government and 
the importance of traditions (see Figure A.13 and Table A.8). Among parents, four in five 
respondents agree that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for.36 The stronger the agreement, the more important both dimensions 
of policy measures are perceived. This association also seems to be stronger with the financial 
benefits dimension than with the educational policy dimension. About 72 per cent of parents 
think that it is important to uphold tradition (i.e. the customs handed down by one’s religion 
or family).37 This opinion has no influence on the relevance attached to educational policy 
measures. However, it seems that those who strongly agree to this (and are maybe more 
conservative) also think that financial benefits supporting families are more important. One 
may conclude that both, necessities as well as attitudes, affect the relevance ratings of 
different policy measures among parents. 
 
7. Discussion 
7.1. Summary and contextualisation of findings: a policy perspective 
The present report summarised the results of two online surveys being part of the foresight 
activities of the FamiliesAndSocieties project—one directed at experts from science and 
practice and the other one asking parents to represent those who are affected by 
socioeconomic developments and family policy in daily life. Learning from the results of a 
“Futures task force workshop” (Philipov et al., 2014) and focus group discussions with 
policymakers and civil society actors engaged in family-related issues (Mynarska et al., 
2015), the surveys focussed on two central themes: the future of vulnerability of families with 
children and policies to break the cycle of the ongoing reproduction of vulnerability within 
families. The topic of vulnerability remains an important issue for future research. Although 
living standards have been rising in Europe and most other parts of the world in recent 
decades, significant proportions of the society remain vulnerable. Needless to allude, income 
inequality has even increased in the course of the last decades in several countries (cf. OECD, 
2011a; Pew Research Center, 2014). In Europe, the events following the financial crisis in 
2007/08 lead to a deterioration of the economic situation for the working-age population and 
                                                 
36 This is also true for three in four experts though among those who agree, agreement of experts is less strong 
than agreement of parents (compare Figure A.9 and Figure A.13). 
 
37 On the other hand, only 32 per cent of experts are of the same opinion (Figure A.9). 
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their children (European Commission, 2016). Children are the age group with the highest risk 
of poverty or social exclusion (cf. López Vilaplana, 2013)—a specific challenge for European 
politics. 
 
In our expert questionnaire study, we first sought an answer to the question how vulnerability 
of families with children will develop until the year 2050. Information from 176 submitted 
questionnaires revealed that experts expected the share of vulnerable families with children to 
increase across Europe. Irrespective of the dimension of vulnerability (economic, 
psychological or social), scientists and practitioners seemed to be rather pessimistic, thus 
further establishing the relevance of the topic for future politics. Second, we were interested 
in views about societal developments that might drive future vulnerability of families with 
children. Experts considered economic development to be most relevant for the vulnerability 
of families with children in the future. They assumed that economic development would not 
only affect economic vulnerability but also influence psychological and social vulnerability. 
However, it was not the development of GDP per capita that was perceived to be influential 
but rather the future development of unemployment and (in)equality in earnings. Family 
policies were also considered important for all three dimensions of vulnerability. In particular, 
financial transfers to families and access to public childcare were assumed to affect economic 
and psychological vulnerability. Both these measures plus government support for parents to 
reorganise their workload were also thought to influence social vulnerability. As experts on 
average estimated unemployment and earnings inequality to increase as well as public 
transfers to decrease expectations of a rising vulnerability of families with children in the 
future are probably not surprising. 
 
Cultural changes were not perceived to affect economic vulnerability. Nevertheless, experts 
thought that they might be important for social and in particular psychological vulnerability. 
Detailed results indicated that a weakening strength of personal relationships might lead to 
higher psychological vulnerability in the future. In addition, it turned out that rising job 
demands were expected to be a threat for psychological well-being. Changes in gender roles 
were evaluated with some ambivalence: while higher female labour force participation (to be 
expected) would increase the future share of families affected by psychological vulnerability, 
more involvement of men in childcare would decrease it. 
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On the one hand, there is a pessimistic evaluation of the future development of vulnerability 
of families with children in Europe. On the other hand, however, experts expect policies to be 
capable of reducing vulnerability in principle. Family policy was rated the second most 
important driving force of future vulnerability after economic development. In addition, future 
policy might counteract unemployment and rising inequalities in earnings. Anyway, family 
policy is key to reducing poverty (e.g., Lohmann, 2009; Troger & Verwiebe, 2015) and to 
enhancing life chances of children in Europe in the future. Unsurprisingly, the experts’ 
assessments are largely in line with the existing literature. However, the assumed relevance of 
policy was even more pronounced for the parents responding to the family questionnaire. 
They attached the greatest importance for future well-being of families with children to 
changes in welfare and family policy and to the reconciliation of family life and professional 
work. 
 
Another main aim of the present study was to assess the relevance attributed to ten selected 
policy measures that should be able to mitigate or even stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
within families. In the literature, family structure, family policy and educational policy are 
considered to be important determinants of societal inequality (cf. Huber & Stephens, 2014; 
McLanahan & Percheski, 2008; Solga, 2014). In focus groups, discussants primarily stressed 
the relevance of education to overcome social heritage (Mynarska et al., 2015). Indeed, 
education and childcare policies affect differences in intergenerational social mobility across 
industrialised countries (Causa & Johansson, 2010). Existing evidence indicates that 
educational reforms can help children from a disadvantaged background—at least to a certain 
degree—to close the gap between them and more advantaged groups of children (e.g. Jacob & 
Ludwig, 2009; Riederer & Verwiebe, 2015). Furthermore, education has become ever more 
important for inequality in the US in recent decades according to Autor (2014), as the wage 
premium to higher education shows a tremendous growth. 
 
Findings of the expert questionnaire confirm the relevance attributed to education—at least to 
some degree. The three policy measures identified as being most important by experts were 
the provision of childcare options for preschool children, assistance for children with special 
needs and raising the awareness of employers regarding the work–life balance of their 
employees, closely followed by providing education for all children already at an early age. 
Raising the awareness of employers refers to another aspect emphasised in focus group 
discussions: to understand education in a broad sense including informing of all societal 
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actors but especially parents and employers (Mynarska et al., 2015). Other suggestions such 
as lowering the prices of daily used products or supporting stay-at-home mothers were 
perceived as much less useful in stopping the transfer of vulnerability within families from 
one generation to the next. Support for stay-at-home mothers was even evaluated as counter-
productive to this aim by a noteworthy proportion of experts. Parents participating in the 
family survey, on the other hand, did not share this opinion. For them, support for stay-at-
home mothers was among the most important policy measures to stop the reproduction of 
vulnerability.38 In line with experts, however, responding parents also emphasised the 
relevance of raising the awareness of employers regarding the work–life balance of their 
employees and the necessity of assistance for children with special needs. To sum up, there is 
much coherence between experts and parents but also some disagreement. As our samples are 
neither representative for experts nor for families in Europe, the extent to which differences 
between opinions of experts and parents result from their different positions remains an open 
question. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the perspective of parents is different to the one 
of experts. While parents experience concrete needs in their daily life, experts usually adopt a 
more distant and forward-looking perspective. Financial support or staying at home, for 
instance, will solve problems of a family in the short run but not necessarily improve the 
situation of vulnerable families (as a large societal group) in the long run. 
 
The dynamics of inequality differ across Europe (Mau & Verwiebe, 2010) as well as 
availability and affordability of quality childcare or support for early childhood development 
(Bouget et al., 2015). Therefore the way how public policies “structure a child’s opportunities 
and determine the extent to which adult earnings are related to family background” differ 
across countries (Corak, 2013, 80). Education is of importance in this respect; however, 
existing (national) policies and current involvement of the European Union in education were 
characterised as “ambivalent and partly contradictory” (Agostini & Natali, 2015, 154). The 
rhetoric relevance of education and training has not led to higher investments in education. 
Improvements of policies seem to be necessary to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
within families. Without any doubt experts perceived education to be important while a large 
part of parents did not seem to be equally convinced. Maybe the quality of, and the 
                                                 
38 It has to be noted that the difference between experts and parents regarding the effectiveness of support for 
stay-at-home mothers is partly driven by a specific group of experts: The average rating of experts from northern 
Europe is much lower than ratings from experts from other regions (or parents from northern Europe). 
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confidence in, the educational systems have to be increased. In addition, several other policies 
were identified as relevant as well. An integrated approach might thus be a possible answer to 
future challenges. 
 
7.2. Policies: a specific outlook 
Experts share the view that vulnerability of families with children will not decline and is 
likely to increase during the forthcoming decades. This inference holds for all three 
dimensions of vulnerability, based on rising uncertainty in times of diversifying markets, 
swift technological advance, merging of cultures as well as open borders. The response of 
governments to these globalisation changes is linked to the provision of policies and safety 
nets designed to support people in need such as the poor, the invalidated, elderly people and 
vulnerable families with children. Indeed, our survey showed that experts view policies, along 
with economic development, as an important instrument towards preventing vulnerability and 
thus supporting not only individual families but societies as a whole. Parents themselves were 
even more convinced of the usefulness of policies. 
 
The expected rise in vulnerability requires an adequate policy enforcement. However, policy 
instruments might be restricted in their aim to effectively counteract negative trends in 
vulnerability that accompany future social, economic, technological and cultural change. 
Moreover policies can be costly and governments’ capacities to provide these costs are 
restricted. Capacities are an external constraint that policymakers have to comply with, yet 
policy effectiveness can be continuously improved when policies need to be adjusted to 
changing societal environments. To this end, operative policy monitoring would be helpful 
(see also Eurofound, 2015). Monitoring should also include the acceptance of offered policy 
instruments by parents (as views of parents might differ from those of experts). In the 
following, however, we discuss two other, rather specific aspects of monitoring, namely the 
use of synthetic indices describing the object of interest and the use of the mainstreaming 
approach. In our case, indices can refer to the three dimensions of vulnerability. 
 
During recent years the use of indices constructed for specific policy purposes has been 
expanding. One example is the active ageing index (AAI) developed by the European 
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Commission together with the UNECE.39 This index describes the situation of elderly people 
in European countries and indicates whether expected advances in “active ageing” have 
actually been observed—optimising the opportunities for health, participation and security in 
order to enhance the quality of life in old age, both for individuals and population groups. So 
it supports policymaking with the provision of direct information about the object of interest. 
Another index of similar nature is the material deprivation index constructed and followed by 
Eurostat, which is an index used for monitoring poverty. These and other similar indices can 
be used for international comparisons but are also applicable for comparison of regions within 
a country. 
 
The index about risk of poverty and social exclusion is directly relevant to material 
vulnerability. It is extensively used in this report and at the beginning of our work it served its 
verification. It can be effectively used for monitoring the economic dimension of vulnerability 
as illustrated in its analysis in Section 3 in this report. The other two dimensions of 
vulnerability of families are not linked to a similar index. Apparently, if such indices were 
available the monitoring of vulnerability change would be improved. It might be too 
demanding, however, for statistical bodies to consider an index specifically for the 
vulnerability of families with children and for the reproduction of that vulnerability. These 
indices can be constructed by scientific experts from different disciplines. A potential research 
would first have to identify the components of the index (the AAI, for instance, is based on 
more than 30 statistically observed items) and second have to combine them (weighted in 
accordance with the significance of their effect on vulnerability). 
 
The second aspect in monitoring policies’ effectiveness refers to advantages and 
disadvantages in the mainstreaming approach. We consider policy measures which experts 
participating in the focus group discussions identified as most important and experts 
participating in the online survey (as well as parents responding to the family survey) 
evaluated for their relevance to reproduction of vulnerability. 
 
Tables 10 and 11 include these measures, ten in total. They belong to different social or 
economic policies, some to more than one. For example, the first measure (direct financial 
                                                 
39 See http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/display/AAI/Active+Ageing+Index+Home. 
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transfers) belongs to family policies but also to policies that fight poverty in general. This also 
applies to the second measure, as lower prices can be understood as indirect (financial) 
transfers in kind. Childcare is a fundamental measure related to family policies but also to 
policies related to the reconciliation of professional work and care for the family. Assistance 
for disabled children is an item that belongs to well-designed policies for the disabled in line 
with the international Convention on the Rights of the Child. Several items in the table relate 
to education policies. 
 
To these items we can add others not explicitly specified here although they are bound to have 
an effect on vulnerability: for example, policies related to employment and unemployment, 
policies mitigating income inequality and other economic policies. In general, the list of 
relevant policies is extremely large, thus indicating that family vulnerability can permeate, 
and does permeate, numerous policies. Therefore, it is a topic that has been mainstreamed 
across diverse policies. 
 
With the inclusion of the matter of interest in a broad circle of policies mainstreaming bears 
important advantages. Care should be taken however for possible potential shortcomings in its 
application which might arise when certain policy measures may contradict each other as is 
the case, for instance, with policies aiming to increase female labour force participation and 
policies supporting childcare leave. The issue that single measures have to go hand in hand 
with each other was repeatedly raised during the focus group discussions where experts 
recognised the necessity for a comprehensive strategy and complementarity of policies in 
supporting vulnerable families and children in them. Monitoring can help to identify cases of 
conflicting policies. Yet monitoring a large list of adequate policy measures is time-
demanding and can hardly be effective. An appropriate way would be to give priority to 
certain policy aspects and link them with indices related to family vulnerability. This match 
assures that contradicting policies can be avoided. 
 
A couple of items included in Tables 10 and 11 call for additional attention. The last item 
refers to awareness among employers. Raising the awareness given to needs of families with 
children is necessary not only with respect to employers but to the society as a whole. This is 
an appropriate field of work for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Counselling, 
advocacy and other activities typical for NGOs are also related to our topic of interest. We 
have witnessed these activities being carried out by the participants in the preparation of this 
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survey: the International Federation for Family Development (IFFD) and the European Large 
Families Confederation (ELFAC). NGOs can successfully support governments and 
communities in raising awareness about needs and problems, informing the public about 
policymaking and explaining the meaning of policy measures related to the vulnerability of 
families with children. 
 
7.3. Implications for future research 
The final section of this report might offer some implications and suggestions for future 
research. First, future research should observe the development of child vulnerability across 
Europe in more detail. As already mentioned in the section above, the development of 
synthetic indices that measure different dimensions of vulnerability and are appropriate for 
the situation of children is of high priority. 
 
With regard to the accumulation of wealth and the intergenerational reproduction of 
vulnerability, social research should, second, observe for which sectors of the societies 
“gains” or “losses” might arise. This is important for several reasons: culminations of 
disadvantages might be particularly problematic (and unfair) if existing differences manifest 
themselves over generations—with consequences for the society as a whole. For instance, 
rising inequality resulting from increasing disadvantages to the lower classes might be 
detrimental to economic growth (OECD, 2015b). Families belonging to lower strata often 
react to a worsening of their situation by restricting their children’s education. In 
consequence, the potential of future generations will not be fully exploited. 
 
Third, studies that clarify possible interconnections between societal developments, 
contradictory consequences of changes, conflicting aims and all kinds of ambivalences of 
different policies are desperately needed. Concerning the effect of changing gender roles, for 
instance, focus group participants made very clear that they expect higher female employment 
to positively affect economic vulnerability. At the same time, however, it might negatively 
affect psychological vulnerability if neither childcare by fathers nor public childcare were to 
increase. In the present study, higher shares in female employment were indeed assumed to 
increase psychological vulnerability while higher male participation in childcare and an 
increase in availability of public childcare were assumed to help decrease it. Furthermore, 
there was some disagreement among experts concerning policy measures. One policy measure 
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in particular was perceived very ambivalently: while 16 per cent of respondents stated that 
support for stay-at-home mothers would be indispensable, another 15 per cent expressed the 
opinion that such support would in fact be counter-productive. Thus, findings of the expert 
questionnaire study are in line with the (high degree of) ambivalence found in focus group 
research and may even add to the complexity. 
 
Fourth, future research should go beyond the present research that was based on convenience 
sampling. In particular, the research questions of our family questionnaire have to be 
addressed using representative samples for populations of as many European countries as 
possible. In addition, the obtained data should allow for detailed analyses of frequently 
vulnerable family types because different family types likely have different priorities 
regarding policy measures.40 
 
Fifth, the present paper nevertheless clearly demonstrates that opinions of experts who are 
advising policymakers and parents who are affected by implemented policies do sometimes 
differ. Politicians seem to be aware of this and for the sake of their popularity (to maximise 
the number of votes), they do not always follow scientific expertise. On the other hand, 
scientific studies other than political (opinion) research directly focussing on popular views 
could also take into account public acceptance of suggested measures, at least if it wants to 
support political decision making. 
 
Sixth, researchers may consider more drivers of vulnerability in future studies. Following 
from our methodological approach, we included only those drivers in our questionnaire that 
were identified to be most important in prior focus group discussions. Other developments 
like technological progress or educational mobility, for instance, were not explicitly 
addressed. Effects of the latter seem to be of particular interest. At least economic 
vulnerability should be reduced with larger shares of high-educated people. While educational 
                                                 
40 For instance, the family questionnaire study does not allow final conclusions about differences between large 
families and single-parent families due to the low case number of respondents living without a partner. In focus 
groups, participants mentioned that single-parent families have the same problems all families have but that 
these problems are sometimes more severe when the support by a partner is missing. Though descriptive results 
showed that most policy measures were more important for single parents than for respondents on average, the 
absence of a partner in the household did not have any significant effects on assessments of policies in 
multivariate analyses. The reason for this result, however, may also be that the questions analysed in this paper 
referred to the effectiveness of policies in mitigating vulnerability reproduction in general and not to the 
effectiveness of policies in improving the present-day situation of parents. 
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policy measures are expected to be relevant to stop vulnerability reproduction, economic 
vulnerability did however not disappear albeit the educational expansion of the last decades. 
As average education of the labour force is rising, standards expected by employers and 
competition for well-paid jobs changes as well. In addition, a difference between poverty in 
absolute and in relative terms has to be made. Finally, it is even less clear how education 
affects psychological and social vulnerability. On the whole, effects of education on 
vulnerability may thus be extraordinarily complex. 
 
Finally, demographic research has not yet given much attention to intergenerational 
reproduction of vulnerability and its possible consequences for the future distribution of 
family forms and demographic change (for one notable exception see Musick & Mare, 2004, 
albeit with a focus on the US only). Mare (2011) even suggests that looking at more than two 
generations might be necessary to realise the consequences of intergenerational transmission. 
Future research in demography might be well advised thinking along these lines. 
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Appendix I: Additional tables on vulnerability in Europe 
 
The European Union uses the concept of “being at risk of poverty or social exclusion” to 
measure vulnerability. This refers to the situation of people either at risk of poverty, or being 
severely materially deprived or living in a household with a very low work intensity: 
 
 The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is set at 60 per cent of the national median equalised 
disposable income after social transfers. 
 Severe material deprivation refers to a state of economic strain, defined as the 
enforced inability to pay for at least four of the following items: (a) rent, mortgage or 
utility bills, (b) to keep the home adequately warm, (c) unexpected expenses, (d) to eat 
meat or proteins regularly, (e) to go on holiday, (f) a television set, (g) a washing 
machine, (h) a car, (i) a telephone. 
 The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the total number of months that all 
working-age household members were working during the income reference year and 
the total number of months the same household members theoretically could have 
worked in the same period (a number between 0 and 1). Low work intensity is defined 
to be below a threshold set at 0.20.41 
 
The following tables give rates of (1) children below age 16, (2) large families, and (3) single 
persons with dependent children who are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Large families 
were defined as households with two adults and three or more dependent children. For 
EUROSTAT, dependent children are children below 18 as well as children between 18 and 24 
if living with at least one parent and economically inactive. 
Data was taken from EUROSTAT database. Rates of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion are presented for 2004/05, 2009/10 and 2013/14 to give an overview of 
developments during the last ten years. The rate shown in the tables is the average rate over 
two years or the rate for the only available year, respectively. 
 
                                                 
41 Cf. Eurostat glossary and included links available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:At_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_%28AROPE%29. 
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Table A.1: Children under age 16 at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
% of households 2004-05 2009-10 2013-14 
Central western Europe    
Austria 19 22 24 
Belgium 23 22 22 
Germany 17 21 19 
France 19 22 21 
Luxembourg 22 22 25 
Netherlands 20 17 17 
Switzerland - 20 17 
Western Europe    
Ireland 28 33 34 
United Kingdom 32 29 32 
Northern Europe    
Denmark 15 15 16 
Finland 15 14 14 
Iceland 16 14 17 
Norway 14 14 13 
Sweden 16 14 15 
Southern Europe    
Cyprus 21 21 27 
Greece 25 29 38 
Italy 28 28 31 
Malta 24 26 32 
Portugal 29 27 31 
Spain 29 32 32 
Central eastern Europe    
Czech Republic 25 17 16 
Hungary 38 38 42 
Poland 47 30 29 
Slovenia 15 15 17 
Slovakia 35 24 25 
Baltic Countries    
Estonia 28 24 22 
Latvia 45 40 36 
Lithuania 42 33 35 
South eastern Europe    
Bulgaria - 48 52 
Croatia - 29 29 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 50 50 
Romania - 50 48 
Serbia - - 42 
Selected aggregates    
European Union (27 countries) 28 27 27 
Old Member States (15 countries) 23 25 26 
New Member States (12 countries) 44 35 34 
European Union (28 countries) - 27 27 
Note: The rate shown is the average rate or the rate for the only available year, respectively. 
Source: Eurostat (2015; data from EU SILC). 
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Table A.2: Single persons with dependent children at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
% of households 2004-05 2009-10 2013-14 
Central western Europe    
Austria 43 40 44 
Belgium 55 49 55 
Germany 40 52 47 
France 44 43 46 
Luxembourg 38 56 54 
Netherlands 59 49 44 
Switzerland - 40 36 
Western Europe    
Ireland 69 62 65 
United Kingdom 61 58 62 
Northern Europe    
Denmark 38 32 37 
Finland 40 32 34 
Iceland 35 38 42 
Norway 36 37 39 
Sweden 37 36 39 
Southern Europe    
Cyprus 61 44 49 
Greece 55 50 55 
Italy 45 48 44 
Malta 65 74 60 
Portugal 45 51 51 
Spain 47 53 48 
Central eastern Europe    
Czech Republic 58 49 35 
Hungary 54 55 60 
Poland 68 52 47 
Slovenia 32 39 38 
Slovakia 57 41 44 
Baltic Countries    
Estonia 54 46 45 
Latvia 65 58 58 
Lithuania 68 60 56 
South eastern Europe    
Bulgaria - 67 72 
Croatia - 42 46 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - - 79 
Romania - 60 59 
Serbia - - 61 
Selected aggregates    
European Union (27 countries) 50 50 50 
Old Member States (15 countries) 48 50 50 
New Member States (12 countries) 62 54 51 
European Union (28 countries) - 52 50 
Note: The rate shown is the average rate or the rate for the only available year, respectively. 
Source: Eurostat (2015; data from EU SILC). 
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Table A.3: Large families at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
% of households 2004-05 2009-10 2013-14 
Central western Europe    
Austria 24 34 29 
Belgium 22 19 23 
Germany 16 22 18 
France 23 24 25 
Luxembourg 24 27 28 
Netherlands 21 19 22 
Switzerland - 26 25 
Western Europe    
Ireland 29 30 33 
United Kingdom 33 35 36 
Northern Europe    
Denmark 16 14 18 
Finland 15 15 14 
Iceland 15 12 12 
Norway 12 11 8 
Sweden 15 14 15 
Southern Europe    
Cyprus 23 25 27 
Greece 36 33 42 
Italy 37 42 46 
Malta 32 36 40 
Portugal 45 41 51 
Spain 44 48 41 
Central eastern Europe    
Czech Republic 27 27 20 
Hungary 46 47 51 
Poland 62 44 45 
Slovenia 21 18 20 
Slovakia 41 33 38 
Baltic Countries    
Estonia 32 27 23 
Latvia 58 48 45 
Lithuania 60 42 59 
South eastern Europe    
Bulgaria - 83 90 
Croatia - 35 38 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - - 66 
Romania - 73 73 
Serbia - - 54 
Selected aggregates    
European Union (27 countries) 32 32 32 
Old Member States (15 countries) 26 29 29 
New Member States (12 countries) 57 48 50 
European Union (28 countries) - 32 32 
Note: Large families are household with two adults and three or more dependent children. The rate shown is the 
average rate or the rate for the only available year, respectively. Source: Eurostat (2015; data from EU SILC). 
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Appendix II: The expert questionnaire 
Experts received a short invitation via e-mail. All invitations contained the same information 
but were slightly modified by the forwarders of the invitation (e.g. Population Europe, the 
Research Network for the Sociology of Family and Intimate Lives of the European 
Sociological Association, the Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility of the 
International Sociological Association). To give an example, the e-mail text sent by 
Population Europe on  
2 December 2015 is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
The Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital / Vienna Institute of Demography / Austrian Academy of 
Sciences invites you to take part in a study on the future of vulnerable families, which is part of the FamiliesAndSocieties 
project, funded by the EU's 7th Framework Programme (www.familiesandsocieties.eu). The network Population Europe is part 
of this programme. 
 
So far the research project has identified a number of factors important for vulnerable families, for instance economic 
development or cultural change. You are invited to enrich the project's knowledge base by taking part in an expert questionnaire 
study. By collecting your views, the project can assess which of these factors have a strong impact on vulnerability of families in 
the future. 
 
The online questionnaire will only take 20 minutes to complete for one country (a European country of your choice) and one 
dimension of vulnerability. You will also have the possibility to choose a second country or another dimension of vulnerability. 
The exact procedure is explained during the completion of the questionnaire. 
 
The expert questionnaire is available at the following link: 
https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/987648?lang=en 
 
The results of the survey will be used for a scientific report to be submitted to the European Commission. You can choose to 
remain anonymous or identify yourself. In the latter case, the organisers will send you the results of the compilation and list you 
as a contributor, if you wish. A working paper presenting the most important results will also be available at 
www.familiesandsocieties.eu. 
 
The Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital would very much appreciate your participation! 
 
For further information, please feel free to contact to Bernhard.Riederer@oeaw.ac.at or Dimiter.Philipov@oeaw.ac.at. 
 
Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) Vienna Institute of Demography/ 
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Welthandelsplatz 2 / Level 2 A-1020 Vienna / Austria 
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The expert questionnaire itself was structured as follows: 
The first page gave an introduction and a short explanation of the questionnaire. On the 
second page, participants could choose the country their answers will refer to. The biggest 
part of the questionnaire had to be answered with regard to the respective country chosen. If 
participants wanted to complete the questionnaire for more than one country, they had the 
opportunity to follow a link at the end of the survey. This link lead to a shorter version of the 
survey not repeating questions that were not country-specific. (This second, shortened survey 
could be repeated for as many countries a participant wanted to.) 
 
Figure A.1: Title screen of the expert questionnaire 
 
 
 
On the third page, the questionnaire gave definitions of three dimensions of vulnerability 
(economic, psychological and social vulnerability). Participants had to choose one of these 
dimensions. The order in appearance of the three dimensions of vulnerability was randomised 
so that it was not always the same dimension which was shown first. The next group of 
questions had to be answered with regard to the dimension of vulnerability chosen (page 4 to 
21). The definition of the respective dimension of vulnerability chosen was shown at the 
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bottom of the following pages. If participants were willing to answer about more than one 
dimension, they could choose another dimension of vulnerability later (on page 21). 
 
 
Figure A.2: Screenshot of Page 3 of the expert questionnaire 
 
 
 
Beginning on page four, participants were asked to estimate the future development of a 
specific factor (driver) in the chosen country and its impact on the future development of the 
chosen dimension of vulnerability. The screenshot below displays an example of these 
questions (country chosen: United Kingdom; dimension chosen: psychological vulnerability; 
driver: real gross domestic product per capita). 
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Figure A.3: Screenshot of Page 4 of the expert questionnaire 
 
 
 
This procedure of estimating the future development and its impact on vulnerability was 
repeated with each of the fifteen drivers listed below. These drivers represent the five 
somewhat general forces that were identified by participants in prior research (focus group 
discussions). 
 
Main forces and corresponding drivers of the future of families 
Economic development 
 Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita  
 Unemployment 
 Inequality in earnings 
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Cultural change 
 Acceptance of the pluralism of family forms 
 Strength of personal relationships 
 Demands of parenting (i.e. the effort expected of a good parent to make children grow 
up safe and happy) 
Gender roles 
 Female labour force participation 
 Share of men engaged in childcare 
 Frequency of arrangements of shared physical custody (with alternating residence) of 
a child after divorce 
Employment factors affecting the reconciliation of family and work 
 Job demands (in terms of longer working hours and more work commitment) 
 Frequency of flexible working arrangements (such as telecommuting, working from 
home, flexi-time etc.) 
 Work-related geographical mobility of parents 
Family policies 
 Financial support to families (provided by national or regional governments) 
 Access to childcare provided by the government 
 Government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise their workload when they 
want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce worktime or temporarily quit their job) 
 
After asking for the impact of each of the fifteen drivers separately, questions on page 
nineteen aimed at eliciting general assessments of the relative importance of the five forces. 
Participants could distribute an amount of 100 points to the five forces summarising the 15 
drivers to weight the relevance of each force for the future development of vulnerability. First, 
however, it was intended to get estimates for the overall development of the dimensions of 
vulnerability in the country chosen for the near future (until 2020) and the distant future (until 
2050) as well. 
 
Questions on pages twenty and twenty-one asked for additional aspects researchers might 
have to consider with regard to the future of vulnerable families in Europe. While page twenty 
focussed on possible influences of migration flows—especially with regard to the current 
flow of displaced persons (refugees)—page twenty-one provided some space to give more 
detailed opinions on key (local) factors that we might not have taken into account as well as 
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on unexpected developments that might affect social vulnerability in the future (see the 
screenshots below). 
 
Figure A.4: Screenshot of Page 19 of the expert questionnaire 
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Figure A.5: Screenshot of Page 20 of the expert questionnaire 
 
 
 
At the end of page twenty-one, participants could choose to proceed with the final questions 
or to answer the same questions with regard to other dimensions of vulnerability (see Figure 
A.6). If they decided to answer with regard to a second (and a third) dimension of 
vulnerability, they were shown their prior assessments of the developments of the fifteen 
asked drivers. The screenshot below gives an example (see Figure A.7). The sentence 
displayed varied depending on the prior answer of the participants as follows: “You stated 
that real gross domestic product (GDP) will slightly decrease / moderately decrease / strongly 
decrease / stay the same / slightly increase / moderately increase / strongly increase.” 
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Figure A.6: Screenshot of Page 21 of the expert questionnaire 
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Figure A.7: Screenshot of Page 4b of the expert questionnaire 
 
Note: This screen was only shown if participants decided to answer for a second dimension of vulnerability (here: economic vulnerability). 
 
 
 
If participants decided to go on to the final questions (or after giving their assessments for a 
second or third dimension of vulnerability), page twenty-two confronted them with the more 
specific topic of reproduction of vulnerability within families. This time, participants were 
instructed to consider all three dimensions of vulnerability (economic, psychological and 
social vulnerability). Experts were then asked to assess how important several policy 
measures will be if the government wants to prevent children from inheriting vulnerability 
from their families of origin. The screenshot below displays page twenty-two, the list 
following the screenshot gives all policy measures asked for. The choice of policy measures 
was again based on results of the focus group research. 
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Figure A.8: Screenshot of Page 22 of the expert questionnaire 
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Policy measures to prevent children from inheriting vulnerability from their families of origin: 
 direct financial transfers to families in need 
 lower prices of food and other products of day-to-day importance 
 providing information, counselling and coaching for families (parents and kids) 
 providing flexible, affordable childcare options for preschool children (age 0–5) 
 supporting mothers who want to leave the labour market to take care of their children 
 organising assistance for children with special needs (e.g. migrant students with 
language deficits, disabled children) 
 investing in preventative actions with regard to problems with alcohol, drugs or 
violence 
 providing education for all children already at an early age (age 3–5) 
 organising education and mentoring for children after school and during holidays 
 making employers aware that it makes sense to care for the work–life balance of their 
employees 
 
Page twenty-three is about opinions referring to very relevant aspects that could not be taken 
into account in the main body of the questionnaire. Participants should reveal their agreement 
or disagreement with regard to four statements: 
- The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. 
- It is important to hold on tradition, i.e. the customs handed down by one’s religion or 
family. 
- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as 
a mother who does not work. 
- A same-sex couple can bring up a child as well as a male–female couple. 
Experts could answer on a seven-point rating scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”. In addition, it was indicated that the category in the middle of the seven-
point rating scale stands for “I am undecided”. 
 
The final two pages (pages 24 and 25) asked for personal information of participants (age, 
gender, area of expertise and professional affiliation). These questions were all non-
mandatory. Participants could furthermore decide to remain anonymous or give us their name 
to be listed as a contributor in Appendix III of the present report. Finally, participants had an 
opportunity to comment on the questionnaire. 
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After the questionnaire had been finished and submitted, we thanked participants once more 
for their time and expertise. If they wanted to submit assessments relating to other countries, 
they were free to follow a link to a shortened version of the same questionnaire (with a much 
shorter introduction and country-specific questions only). 
 
If readers of the present report want to look into the questionnaire, a demo version of the 
expert questionnaire is available online:  bit.ly/ffeexpsrvy 
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Appendix III: Contributing experts 
We want to declare our deepest gratitude to all the experts who shared their knowledge with 
us. Some of them explicitly stated at the end of the questionnaire that we are allowed to 
mention them as contributors in the Appendix of the present report. These experts are listed in 
the following (in alphabetic order). 
 
Kim Bastaits University of Antwerp 
François de Baudus IPEF (Institut pour l’éducation dans la famille) 
Renaud Chrestien de Beauminy Bank manager, expert on financial issues 
Sanduleasa Bertha National Research Institute for Labour and  
Social Protection, Bucharest (INCSMPS) 
Gian Carlo Blangiardo University Milano Bicocca 
Diederik Boertien European University Institute 
Ioan Bolovan Babeș-Bolyai University 
Daniela Bulgarelli Università degli Studi di Torino 
Sara Darias Curvo University of La Laguna, Tenerife 
Gro Hexeberg Dahl Norwegian National Parents’ Committee for  
Primary and Secondary Education (FUG) 
Olivier Delplanque Association Noémi 
James Stuart Duffin Women for Women 
Ann-Zofie Duvander Stockholm University 
Andreas Eickhorst German Youth Institution (DJI) 
John Eriksen Nordland University, Bodø 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona 
Tineke Fokkema Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute 
(NIDI) 
Alessandro Gentile Universidad de Zaragoza 
Christine Geserick Austrian Institute for Family Studies 
Christian Hellevang Norwegian Municipalities, KS 
Matthias Herzog Psychotherapist, expert for family psychology 
Hana Janata National Institute of Public Health 
Maria Von Kaenel Dachverband Regenbogenfamilien/  
familles arc-en-ciel 
Werner van Katwijk Ouders van Waarde 
Yuri Kazepov University of Vienna 
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Irina Kletsina Herzen State Pedagogical University 
Alison Koslowski University of Edinburgh 
Johanna Lammi-Taskula Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) 
Trude Lappegard Statistics Norway 
Jianghong Li WZB Berlin, Social Science Center 
Niklas Lofgren Social Insurance Agency 
Valerie Maher One Family 
Seamus Mannion Youth Advocate Programmes 
Gillier Maylis Femina Europa 
Elvira Mendez Asociación Salud y Familia 
Julio Carabaña Morales Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) 
Ingrid Moritz Chamber of Labour Vienna 
Mariela Nankova NM “Women and Mothers against Violence” 
Despina Naziri University of Liège, Belgium 
Jaap Nieuwenhuis Delft University of Technology 
Lina Papadopoulou Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
Silvia Pasqua Università di Torino 
Victor Petuya Federación de Asociaciones de Padres y Madres de 
Alumnos de Euskadi / Euskadiko Ikasleen Guraso 
Elkarteen Federazioa (FAPAE/EIGEF) 
Karel Phlips International Federation for Family Development 
(IFFD) 
Chiara Pronzato University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto 
Rudolf Richter University of Vienna 
Jitka Rychtarikova Charles University, Prague 
Eszter Salamon European Parents’ Association 
Gustavo De Santis University of Florence 
Helmut Sax Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights 
Giulia Scaravelli Istituto Superiore di Sanità 
Sarah Grace See Collegio Carlo Alberto 
Vladimir Solodnikov Russian State University for Humanities 
Daniele Spizzichino Health expert, Italian National Institute of Statistics 
Maria Letizia Tanturri University of Padova 
Giorgio Tarassi Associazione OEFFE 
Janusz Wardak Akademia Familijna, Poland 
Robert Whiston Men’s Aid 
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Appendix IV: Additional results of the expert questionnaire study 
First, Figure A.9 presents results regarding four different statements included in the expert 
questionnaire that were not discussed in the main body of the present report because they are 
only indirectly linked to vulnerability. Nevertheless, these findings are of interest of their 
own. Second, in the main text we gave average ratings for developments of drivers in three 
different tables, each time linked to expectations regarding one of three dimensions of 
vulnerability. Table A.4 summarises all available information (ratings) – i.e. irrespective of 
the dimension of vulnerability chosen by respondents. 
 
Figure A.9: Experts’ opinions on four additional issues 
 
Note: N=175. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Table A.4: Mean ratings for the future development of drivers of vulnerability 
Forces and corresponding drivers of future vulnerability  
(share of vulnerable families in 2050) 
Development of driver (-3 to +3) 
m (sd) median minimum / maximum 
Economic development     
Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita .16 (1.15) 1 -3 / 2 
Unemployment .24 (1.09) 0 -2 / 3 
Inequality in earnings .93 (1.16) 1 -2 / 3 
Cultural change     
Acceptance of the pluralism of family forms 1.21 (.92) 1 -2 / 3 
Strength of personal relationships -.31 (.91) 0 -3 / 2 
Demands of parenting (i.e. the effort expected of a good parent to make  
children grow up safe and happy) 1.11 (.93) 1 -2 / 3 
Gender roles     
Female labour force participation 1.03 (.92) 1 -3 / 3 
Share of men engaged in childcare 1.05 (.70) 1 -1 / 3 
Frequency of arrangements of shared physical custody (with alternating  
residence) of a child after divorce 1.24 (.82) 1 -2 / 3 
Employment factors affecting the reconciliation of family and work     
Job demands (in terms of longer working hours and more work commitment) .81 (1.06) 1 -2 / 3 
Frequency of flexible working arrangements (such as telecommuting,  
working from home, flexi-time etc.) 1.30 (.80) 1 -3 / 3 
Work-related geographical mobility of parents 1.01 (.75) 1 -1 / 3 
Family policies     
Financial support to families (provided by national or regional governments) -.38 (1.12) 0 -3 / 3 
Access to childcare provided by the government .35 (1.06) 1 -3 / 3 
Government support for fathers and mothers to reorganise their workload when they 
want to dedicate time to parenting (reduce worktime or temporarily quit their job) .45 (.92) 1 -3 / 3 
Note: N = 176. Experts assessed whether the driver will strongly decrease (-3), moderately decrease (-2), slightly decrease (-1), 
stay roughly the same (0), slightly increase (+1), moderately increase (+2) or strongly increase (+3). The table presents the  
mean (m) and the corresponding standard deviation (sd) of ratings, the median and the minimum as well as the maximum value 
chosen by respondents. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Expert Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Appendix V: The family questionnaire 
The family questionnaire was implemented in six languages: English, French, German, 
Italian, Polish and Spanish. Data collection was organised by IFFD and ELFAC. The English 
version of the invitation is given below. 
 
 
Dear Madam or Sir,  
 
Our study asks for the participation of parents. We would like to invite you to take part in this study on families in Europe. In the 
FamiliesAndSocieties project, we contact experts for families to find out their views on the present and future of families in 
Europe. Since you as a parent are part of a family, you are an expert that we need! Therefore, we hope you will find the time to 
participate in this important study. Filling out the survey will take about 15 minutes. 
 
We want to know more about your situation and opinions to find out what factors might influence the future of families. You as a 
participant will remain anonymous. The assessments of all contributors will be compiled and analysed in aggregated form by 
researchers of the FamiliesAndSocieties project. The results of the study will be used for a scientific report to be submitted to 
the European Commission. A working paper presenting the most important results will also be available at 
www.familiesandsocieties.eu. 
 
To answer the questionnaire, please follow this link: http://bit.ly/ffesrvyXenX 
 
The VID/ÖAW, IFFD and ELFAC would very much appreciate your participation! 
 
For further information, please feel free to contact  
Bernhard.Riederer@oeaw.ac.at 
Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) 
Vienna Institute of Demography / Austrian Academy of Sciences 
Welthandelsplatz 2 / Level 2, A-1020 Vienna / Austria 
 
About the project FamiliesAndSocieties (www.familiesandsocieties.eu)  
The project is financed by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme and coordinated by the  
Stockholm University. The project consortium consists of 25 partners from 15 European countries and three transnational civil society actors. The general aim is to 
investigate the increasing diversity of family forms in Europe and to assess the compatibility of existing policies with family changes. This questionnaire is a part of a Work 
Package 10 on the future of families that is coordinated by the Vienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences). Both, IFFD and ELFAC participate in this 
work package. 
 
 
 
The family questionnaire was structured as follows: on the welcome screen (see Figure A.10), 
respondents could choose to answer the questionnaire in one of six languages (English, 
French, German, Italian, Polish or Spanish).42 Next, parents were requested to inform us about 
the number of children and the age of their youngest child before entering the main parts of 
the questionnaire. The first main part of the questionnaire included questions about the 
situation of families in general in the participant’s country (four items), the situation of the 
                                                 
42 Respondents should usually be presented with the correct language version of the questionnaire from the 
beginning as we prepared six versions of the invitation including the respective link. 
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participant as a parent (four items) and whether certain policy measures would help to 
improve the reconciliation of work and family (five items). The second main part of the 
questionnaire focused on the future of children. It consisted of three items regarding worries 
about the future of respondents’ own children (only asked if they stated that they had children 
below age 25) and three statements about the situation of children in general. 
 
Figure A.10: Screenshot of the Welcome screen of the family questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
The next parts of the questionnaire were directly related to the main topic(s) of the expert 
questionnaire. In the third main part of the family questionnaire, participants were asked to 
indicate how important they think the five forces (identified in focus group discussions) were 
for the future of families in Europe. Unlike in the expert questionnaire, respondents were not 
requested to rate the impact of each single driver or give relative weights to the five forces. 
Participants in the family questionnaire rather used seven-point rating scales ranging from 
“will not be important at all” to “will be very important for families” (see Figure A.11). The 
fourth main part of the family questionnaire basically copied the question about policy 
measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability within families on page 22 of the expert 
questionnaire (see above). Though the list of policy measures was the same, the wording of 
the question itself as well as the rating scale had to be modified to meet the requirements of 
the family questionnaire (i.e. avoiding technical terms, see Figure A.12). 
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The next part of the family questionnaire consisted of statements reflecting general opinions 
with regard to several different aspects of policy matters and family life (six items) and 
offered an opportunity to comment on the questionnaire, add opinions or suggest additional 
topics not covered by the existing questionnaire. The final part asked for personal and 
demographic information (age, country of residence, partner status, main activity etc.). 
 
Figure A.11: Screenshot of Page 7 of the family questionnaire 
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Figure A.12: Screenshot of Page 8 of the family questionnaire 
 
 
 
If readers want to look into the family questionnaire, demo versions of the questionnaire are 
available online:  English:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=en 
French:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=fr 
German:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=de 
Italian:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=it 
Polish:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=pl 
Spanish:  https://survey.econ.tuwien.ac.at/limesurvey/index.php/974141?lang=es 
 
 107 
 
Appendix VI: Additional results of the family questionnaire study 
Figure A.13 gives the opinions of participating parents on several issues that can be compared 
to views of experts shown in Figure A.9. Tables A.5 and A.6 allow for comparisons across 
regions using the categories also applied in the analyses of expert questionnaire data. The 
final tables (A.7 and A.8) present some detailed results already discussed in the main body of 
this working paper (cf. Section 6.3.2). 
 
 
 
Figure A.13: Parents’ opinions on additional issues 
 
Note: N = 1,343. Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Table A.5: Drivers affecting vulnerability of families with children 
Drivers of future vulnerability 
Central western 
Europe 
German-speaking 
part of Europe 
Western  
Europe 
Northern  
Europe 
Southern  
Europe 
Eastern  
Europe 
Europe  
(total) 
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) 
Economic development 4.75 (1.67) 5.38 (1.50) 5.00 (2.83) 5.57 (.98) 5.88 (1.32) 5.76 (1.48) 5.72 (1.41) 
Gender roles 4.81 (1.69) 4.73 (2.03) 5.80 (1.10) 4.43 (2.15) 5.24 (1.76) 4.12 (1.89) 5.05 (1.86) 
Cultural change 5.84 (1.27) 5.04 (1.72) 5.60 (1.34) 5.29 (1.38) 5.56 (1.49) 5.42 (1.58) 5.44 (1.56) 
Employment factors affecting the 
reconciliation of family and work 5.90 (1.24) 5.36 (1.69) 5.80 (1.64) 5.57 (1.13) 6.26 (1.15) 5.25 (1.32) 5.97 (1.38) 
Family policies 5.84 (1.19) 5.94 (1.36) 6.20 (1.30) 5.00 (2.08) 6.11 (1.24) 5.15 (1.56) 6.00 (1.31) 
N (min-max) 30-32  260-276  4-5  7  751-790  59-61  1,124-1,170 
Note: The original scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for families”. Shown are means (m) and standard deviations (sd). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Table A.6: Policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
Policy measures to stop the 
reproduction of vulnerability  
within families 
Central western 
Europe 
German-speaking 
part of Europe 
Western  
Europe 
Northern  
Europe 
Southern  
Europe 
Eastern  
Europe 
Europe  
(total) 
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) 
1. direct financial transfers to 
families in need 4.84 (1.76) 5.17 (1.81) 5.67 (1.21) 4.14 (1.95) 5.51 (1.65) 4.63 (1.95) 5.38 (1.72) 
2. lower prices of food and other 
products of day-to-day 
importance 
4.16 (1.82) 4.86 (1.91) 6.17 (1.17) 4.14 (1.95) 5.87 (1.39) 5.30 (1.84) 5.58 (1.63) 
3. providing information, counselling 
and coaching for families 
(parents and kids) 
5.28 (1.49) 5.57 (1.61) 6.60 (.84) 5.71 (1.80) 5.67 (1.46) 5.32 (1.64) 5.63 (1.51) 
4. providing flexible, affordable 
childcare options for preschool 
children (age 0–5) 
5.16 (1.42) 4.90 (1.93) 6.17 (1.17) 5.43 (2.07) 5.98 (1.32) 5.19 (1.87) 5.69 (1.57) 
5. supporting mothers who want to 
leave the labour market to take 
care of their children 
6.41 (1.10) 5.88 (1.65) 6.83 (.41) 5.43 (2.07) 6.26 (1.26) 6.32 (1.27) 6.18 (1.36) 
6. organising assistance for children 
with special needs (e.g. migrant 
students with language deficits, 
disabled children) 
5.75 (1.39) 5.67 (1.53) 6.00 (1.55) 6.14 (.90) 6.22 (1.18) 5.63 (1.58) 6.06 (1.31) 
7. investing in preventative actions 
with regard to problems with 
alcohol, drugs or violence 
5.66 (1.36) 5.42 (1.71) 5.83 (2.40) 6.00 (1.15) 5.94 (1.28) 5.87 (1.21) 5.82 (1.40) 
8. providing education for all 
children already at an early age 
(age 3–5) 
4.41 (2.00) 3.96 (2.14) 4.50 (2.07) 4.14 (2.04) 5.75 (1.54) 4.65 (1.93) 5.26 (1.88) 
9. organising education and 
mentoring for children after 
school and during holidays 
4.28 (1.80) 4.38 (1.96) 4.83 (1.72) 4.57 (1.62) 5.29 (1.62) 4.81 (1.70) 5.04 (1.75) 
10. making employers aware that it 
makes sense to care for the 
work–life balance of their 
employees 
6.28 (1.05) 5.96 (1.54) 5.67 (1.86) 5.43 (1.72) 6.43 (.99) 6.13 (1.07) 6.30 (1.16) 
N 32  290  6  7  945  63  1,343  
Note: The original scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for families”. Shown are means (m) and standard deviations (sd). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Table A.7: Policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
Covariates 
Financial benefits measures Educational policy measures 
b (se) beta p b (se) beta p 
Country of residence: Germany .00    .00    
Portugal .43 (.09) .17 *** 1.16 (.10) .43 *** 
Spain .78 (.09) .30 *** .96 (.10) .34 *** 
Other European country .29 (.13) .07 * .60 (.14) .13 *** 
Gender: male .00    .00    
female .33 (.07) .13 *** .52 (.07) .19 *** 
Age: below 35 years .00    .00    
36-40 years .15 (.10) .06  .21 (.11) .07 * 
41-45 years .15 (.11) .05  .13 (.12) .04  
46-50 years -.02 (.14) -.01  .09 (.15) .03  
51 years or older -.07 (.18) -.02  .05 (.19) .01  
Youngest child: below 3 years .00    .00    
3-5 years -.04 (.09) -.01  -.03 (.09) -.01  
6-9 years .00 (.11) .00  -.06 (.11) -.02  
10-15 years .34 (.14) .10 * .27 (.15) .07 (*) 
16-30 years .29 (.30) .06  .08 (.32) .02  
Number of children: 1 or 2 children .00    .00    
3 children .08 (.12) .03  .09 (.13) .03  
4 children .23 (.14) .08 (*) .11 (.14) .04  
5 or more children .19 (.14) .06  -.26 (.15) -.08 (*) 
Household composition:         
partner (no/yes) .03 (.13) .01  -.01 (.14) .00  
child below 15 years (no/yes) -.28 (.26) -.06  -.41 (.28) -.08  
older child (no/yes) -.09 (.09) -.03  -.12 (.10) -.04  
grandparents (no/yes) .23 (.11) .05 * .04 (.12) .01  
Education:          
tertiary education (no/yes) -.25 (.08) -.09 ** -.21 (.08) -.07 * 
Financial situation: make ends meet         
with difficulty .00    .00    
some difficulty -.21 (.08) -.08 * -.21 (.09) -.07 * 
fairly easily -.52 (.09) -.17 *** -.31 (.10) -.10 ** 
easily -.67 (.10) -.22 *** -.32 (.11) -.09 ** 
Migration background (no/yes) .00 (.01) -.01  .00 (.01) .02  
R2adj. .15    .19    
Note: N=1,293. The scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for families”. Shown 
are both unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (b and beta, respectively) and standard errors (se). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations. 
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Table A.8: Policy measures to stop the reproduction of vulnerability 
Covariates 
Financial benefits measures Educational policy measures 
b (se) beta p b (se) beta p 
Country of residence: Germany .00    .00    
Portugal .32 (.09) .13 *** 1.08 (.10) .40 *** 
Spain .50 (.09) .19 *** .75 (.10) .27 *** 
Other European country .23 (.13) .06 (*) .56 (.14) .12 *** 
Gender: male .00    .00    
female .26 (.07) .10 *** .47 (.07) .17 *** 
Age: below 35 years .00    .00    
36-40 years .13 (.09) .05  .19 (.10) .07 (*) 
41-45 years .14 (.11) .05  .11 (.12) .04  
46-50 years -.03 (.14) -.01  .08 (.15) .02  
51 years or older -.09 (.17) -.03  .03 (.18) .01  
Youngest child: below 3 years .00    .00    
3-5 years -.07 (.08) -.03  -.05 (.09) -.01  
6-9 years -.05 (.10) -.02  -.09 (.11) -.03  
10-15 years .27 (.13) .08 * .23 (.15) .06  
16-30 years .19 (.28) .04  .02 (.31) .00  
Number of children: 1 or 2 children .00    .00    
3 children .05 (.12) .02  .07 (.13) .03  
4 children .17 (.13) .06  .10 (.14) .03  
5 or more children .12 (.13) .04  -.27 (.15) -.08 (*) 
Household composition:         
partner (no/yes) .02 (.13) .00  .01 (.14) .00  
child below 15 years (no/yes) -.24 (.25) -.05  -.41 (.27) -.08  
older child (no/yes) -.08 (.09) -.03  -.12 (.10) -.04  
grandparents (no/yes) .17 (.11) .04  .00 (.12) .00  
Education:          
tertiary education (no/yes) -.18 (.07) -.06 * -.15 (.08) -.05 (*) 
Financial situation: make ends meet         
with difficulty .00    .00    
some difficulty -.14 (.08) -.06 (*) -.17 (.09) -.06 (*) 
fairly easily -.38 (.09) -.13 *** -.21 (.10) -.07 * 
easily -.45 (.10) -.14 *** -.17 (.11) -.05  
Migration background (no/yes) .00 (.00) -.02  .00 (.01) .01  
Opinions and attitudes:         
government should take more responsibility 
very strong agreement .00    .00    
strong agreement -.45 (.08) -.16 *** -.32 (.09) -.10 *** 
agreement -.83 (.09) -.25 *** -.48 (.10) -.13 *** 
neither agreement/nor disagreement -1.00 (.10) -.27 *** -.72 (.11) -.18 *** 
disagreement -1.01 (.12) -.22 *** -.80 (.13) -.16 *** 
important to hold on to tradition         
very strong agreement .00    .00    
strong agreement -.13 (.08) -.04  -.02 (.09) -.01  
agreement -.23 (.09) -.07 * -.03 (.10) -.01  
neither agreement/nor disagreement -.18 (.09) -.05 * .03 (.10) .01  
disagreement -.06 (.10) -.02  .13 (.11) .03  
R2adj. .25    .22    
Note: N=1,293. The scale ranges from 1 “will not be important at all” to 7 “will be very important for families”. Shown 
are both unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (b and beta, respectively) and standard errors (se). 
Source: FamiliesAndSocieties Family Survey, authors’ own computations.   
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